




March 2015

## The New Waterfront: Who Benefits?

A report for the RICS Research Trust and  
the Institute of Spatial and Environmental  
Planning, Queen's University Belfast





# The New Waterfront: Who Benefits?

# Report for Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors

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## Glossary of terms

<b>ADZ</b>	Associated British Ports
<b>BCC</b>	Belfast City Council
<b>CBDC</b>	Cardiff Bay Development Corporation
<b>CHDDA</b>	Custom House Docks Development Authority
<b>DSD</b>	Department for Social Development [Northern Ireland]
<b>DCC</b>	Dublin City Council
<b>DDDA</b>	Dublin Docklands Development Authority
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>IFSC</b>	International Financial Services Centre [Dublin]
<b>MDC</b>	Merseyside Development Corporation
<b>NITB</b>	Northern Ireland Tourist Board
<b>PPP</b>	Public Private Partnership
<b>PRONI</b>	Public Records Office Northern Ireland
<b>SDZ</b>	Strategic Development Zone
<b>TQ</b>	Titanic Quarter
<b>UDC</b>	Urban Development Corporation


# Executive summary

This report presents the findings of a research project that set out to review the current state of urban waterfront regeneration in the context of neoliberal urbanism and city competitiveness. Many cities and towns have waterfronts which are in a long-term process of redevelopment, following a model of property-based regeneration which seeks to increase asset values through a largely commodified mixed use approach. Waterfronts have become an important strategic aspect of regeneration within neoliberal urbanism, with the space for signature buildings and new commercial and residential developments to help promote the city on the global stage. Although property-based regeneration is often regarded as being led and shaped by the private sector, waterfronts provide an example of how this is not the case. City and national level government provide financial, regulatory and promotional assistance to ensure waterfronts are seen as successful examples of urban growth and dynamism. The analysis of modern waterfronts must therefore take into account the wider urban regeneration discourses of globalism, neoliberalism, competitiveness, creative economies, cultural planning and city marketing.

The research aims are to examine current trends, themes and issues in waterfront regeneration and to assess who benefits from such initiatives, through case studies in different UK jurisdictions and in the Republic of Ireland. The research objectives are:

1. To review the relevant literature to contextualise the project, including: waterfront redevelopment; globalisation, neoliberalism and governance; the 'credit crunch' and property development; the economy and society of the UK and the Irish Republic;
2. To carry out original research in four case study waterfront areas: Belfast, Northern Ireland; Liverpool, England; Cardiff, Wales; and Dublin, Republic of Ireland, to include an assessment of the economic and social benefits of the scheme to nearby disadvantaged areas and to the cities as a whole;
3. To analyse the contribution of the research data to the literature on neoliberalism, waterfront redevelopment, and related areas such as city marketing and gentrification, as well as to the body of work on regeneration in divided cities;
4. To consider whether the research evidence points towards a new stage in waterfront development: the restructured 'competitive waterfront'.
5. To use the theoretical framework to assess 'who benefits' from waterfront redevelopment and to make practical recommendations for the future of such development at a time of economic retrenchment.

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### The research questions are:

- *Has the nature of waterfront development changed in response to the economic downturn? If so, is this change sufficient to be able to theorise a new phase in waterfront development?*
- *How has neoliberalisation impacted on production, consumption and governance in waterfront areas? Who benefits from waterfront regeneration?*
- *What is the contribution of private sector-led development to the economic and social health of cities?*
- *What is the role of the public sector in supporting private development in difficult economic times?*

A literature review and a project scoping phase have resulted in a four-part framework for analysis which sets out the components for a potential new addition to Hoyle's waterfront typology (1988; 2000): the 'competitive waterfront', including aspects of: the ideological framework for development; governance; use of space (land and water); and connectivity.

In addition, four questions have been generated to assess the degree of public benefit from the case study waterfronts:

- 1. Conceptualisation:** What is the understanding of 'public benefit'?
- 2. Type:** How do the public benefit?
- 3. Role:** Who is responsible for the delivery of public benefit?
- 4. Distribution:** Which groups benefit most and least?

The empirical research was undertaken through a largely qualitative methodology and a case study research design, with four case studies: the Belfast waterfront, Cardiff Bay, Dublin Docklands and the Liverpool waterfront. Details of the methodology are provided in Chapter Three. Short profiles of the case studies are provided in Chapter One and Appendix One.

The scale of the project did not permit in-depth inquiry into any of the four areas. Equally, this research is not a programme evaluation. It is a qualitative study about perceptions and perspectives which have generated themes and issues for discussion and analysis. Because much previous research on waterfronts has been descriptive, there is an emphasis here on the generation and testing of an analytical framework rather than on providing in-depth information about each of the four case studies.

## Research findings

Key findings are presented in Chapter Four, which is divided into three parts. Part One sets out narratives of the reasons for and importance of waterfront development for the case study cities. Waterfronts had been developed because land was available due to changing use such as decline in traditional industries and moving of the port function, providing attractive opportunities for mixed use development. Public funding opportunities had been available, particularly in the early years, and there was political support. Waterfronts were seen as a crucial component of city competitiveness and marketing. They were regarded as important sites for the attraction of investment and hence jobs; the amenity value of the waterfront was appreciated; and they allowed cities to present a modern identity including an element of social benefit. Occasionally these positive characteristics led to concern that investment success on the waterfront was at the expense of other areas. The extent to which development had been affected by the economic downturn varied between case studies. Liverpool and Dublin continued to attract investment, Cardiff less so but with some large developments still under way, and Belfast the least. Mixed use remained paradigmatic and was seen as protection against a falling off in demand in any one area. In practice, development was being oriented opportunistically towards whatever could be funded by either the public or private sector. There was a general opinion in all four cases that the waterfront developments were not complete and that there was still a lot of unrealised potential, especially in Dublin and Liverpool where demand had begun to return.

Part Two of Chapter Four assessed the 'competitive waterfront' model (Chapter Two) against case study data, in four parts: the ideological framework for development; governance; use of space (land and water); and connectivity.

**The ideological framework:** There was no question that the primary purpose of all the waterfront areas was to attract private sector investment, to create jobs and to add value. There was a strong discourse about competitiveness and city marketing, with the phrase 'open for business' used several times and a focus on the waterfront as a marketable brand. However, there was an underlying acknowledgement of the importance of public sector financial and strategic support in order to be able to make this happen, resulting in a 'soft neoliberal' approach rather than a sense that the market on its own would be able to achieve regeneration objectives. It was considered important to promote the waterfront and the wider city environment as attractive for investment and tourism, which implied the need for workable public infrastructure such as reliable transport, health, education and policing provision. Specific marketing factors connected to the waterfront include maritime history and historic buildings, modern signature buildings, and quality of life connected with proximity to the water.

**Governance:** In all cases, governance was based on public/private partnerships, although the balance of the two sectors varied between case studies and had also varied over time. Public subsidy was of the utmost importance for facilitating private investment. The private sector was involved in decision-making, sometimes directly as in the case of Belfast where the development agency was a private body, and in other cases indirectly through membership of partnership bodies (such as Liverpool Vision) or through informal contacts. Community involvement in governance – as opposed to community consultation – was extremely limited with the exception of Dublin, where it was built into the legislation that had created the DDDA. We did not find evidence of any significant counter-hegemonic community activity in our case study areas, such as organised campaigning against land use and the presentation of alternative approaches, although in the past there had been protests about aspects of several of the developments. Finally, the creation of strategic planning frameworks was seen as a key state contribution to waterfront regeneration. For the lifetime of these developments, streamlined planning policy had been important for the facilitation of private investment and this looked likely to continue, for example in Dublin's new Strategic Development Zone. However, planning policy was not completely *laissez-faire*, as seen in Liverpool in the Peel Holdings application, which took a long time to process and which was challenged by UNESCO.

**Use of space:** Use of space is of course at the heart of waterfront development, shaped by ideology and governance as described in Chapter Two. The 'competitive waterfront' model underestimated the emotional appeal of water as part of the design and use of waterfront areas. Unsurprisingly, all the case studies had followed a mixed use development model, which had sometimes progressed more slowly than anticipated due to the economic downturn but which had also ensured survival due to ability to adjust phasing and to respond to unforeseen opportunities. Therefore *function* had converged with the rest of the city. However, *form* had not: the availability of large parcels of land had provided opportunities for modern offices and signature buildings, and large scale public events, as well as building conservation and leisure use based around maritime heritage. Housing was generally in the form of high value apartments, with any social or affordable housing provided through public sector agreement with developers, sometime due to community pressure. There was a lack of focus on environmental features such as flood management, but conservation of historic buildings was important as part of maritime heritage, especially in Liverpool. Public access to waterfront areas was not significantly constrained, for example through gated areas, but there were restrictions due to admission charges for amenities; there were, however, free events staged, usually with public subsidy, and all four developments included public art.

**Connectivity:** Connectivity is arguably the Achilles Heel of waterfront developments. We found connectivity of all kinds to be crucial to their success. Five different types of connectivity were identified. Physical connectivity is the most obvious, and was still poor in all our case studies except Liverpool. This means we cannot talk about complete physical integration between waterfronts and the city, even if we can say that functions have converged. A common problem is that transport infrastructure is not provided early in the development, perhaps because it requires public expenditure. Connectivity as part of city marketing is common. International connectivity through technology was not highlighted, except for mention of high speed broadband in Belfast and Liverpool; it may well be an aspect of commercial development that is taken for granted. Finally, connectivity 'of the mind' is linked to identity and a sense of history, and includes civic or community pride in waterfront developments in situations where individuals do not benefit materially. More prosaically, it can also involve a feeling that waterfront developments are further away geographically than they actually are, perhaps due to poor physical connectivity or to barriers such as road systems. We found evidence of both. This can impact on use of waterfront amenities, especially by local residents.

Part Three of Chapter Four examined **attitudes towards public benefit**, using the four questions outlined above. 'Public benefit' was defined very widely, both in terms of who was included and the type of benefit, which could be either individual or collective. Some stated that waterfront development was intrinsically beneficial because it had replaced dereliction. There were contrasting attitudes towards the idea of 'trickle down' benefits from economic development, but the majority of public and private sector participants thought it was a valid approach. The key finding here is that it is important to understand that definitions of both 'public' and 'benefit' in property-led development can be very different from the more targeted approach used in the regeneration of disadvantaged areas.

The types of benefits provided were generally superficial, for example leisure activities rather than jobs or social housing. However, there were also some examples of more targeted benefits such as social housing, education or jobs. Dublin appeared to do better than others, because social benefit was more embedded in their governance structure (see Part Two). It was clear that the *facilitation* of public benefit was achieved largely by the public sector, either through funding, legal or negotiated agreements, or political pressure. Subsequent *implementation* of public benefit could be delivered by any sector. Finally, the question of which groups benefited most and least was hard to answer definitively without access to more reliable and comprehensive statistics; we found no evidence of public benefit being measured systematically, but we found narratives of exclusion which certainly indicated that the benefits were uneven. Again it was an important finding that in most cases *projects were not intended primarily to benefit the local community*; rather their proposed impact was city-wide and further afield including tourists and potential investors.

## Conclusions

Chapter Five assessed the viability of a competitive waterfront model and draws some general conclusions about the future of waterfront development, with recommendations for scholarship and practice.

### Key points included:

- The competitive waterfront model is basically robust despite some differences in the case study developments;
- The ideological framework of 'soft' neoliberalism is as dependent on the state as it is on the private sector;
- Governance excludes community involvement but due to the importance of public subsidy, the balance between public and private is more even than we expected;
- Use of space on the waterfront has converged in terms of function but not of form
- Connectivity remains poor – waterfronts are not physically joined up to the city centre even though they share the same functions.

### Chapter Five also considered the question of public benefit and the waterfront:

- Waterfront developments are not designed primarily to benefit local people or disadvantaged communities; if this is required, it must be overtly built into the strategy or masterplan;
- Perceptions of 'public' and 'benefit' can be very different;
- The public sector almost always facilitates public benefit although it can be implemented by any sector.

### Implications for scholarship include:

- Reassess the importance and appropriateness of international models and policy transfer;
- Reconsider the conceptual division between property-based regeneration and regeneration of 'poor areas' given the amount of public subsidy that goes into both;
- More work is needed on the environmental impact of waterfronts and the impact of the environment on waterfronts;
- Develop the 'competitive waterfront' model and continue to assess the potential of assemblage as an analytical tool: recognise variations in neoliberalism without abandoning the acceptance of a marketised context for development;
- Assess the role of the state in relation to community benefit more closely;
- Assess new funding models;
- Ask whether scholars have been biased towards seeing the worst in waterfronts – have we underestimated the benefits?

### And implications for regeneration policy and practice include:

- Define more carefully who are the intended beneficiaries from waterfront development and what kind of benefits are intended; incorporate into a strategic framework and ensure monitoring and evaluation of implementation;
- Make performance information more readily available to the public as a condition of public funding;
- Put more resources into assessing waterfronts' regeneration performance in a multi-agency framework over time, including public benefit;
- Promote community involvement in governance and programme delivery, including social economy organisations: 'community' may be local people, communities of interest, or other groups;
- Look at programmes to promote waterfront connectivity of all kinds, including connectivity 'of the mind';
- Assess and improve the ecological factors of the development.

# 1.0 Introduction

The urban waterfront has been defined as ‘the water’s edge in cities and towns of all sizes’ (Breen and Rigby, 1994: 10). Many cities and towns have waterfronts which are in a long-term process of redevelopment, following a model of property-based regeneration which seeks to increase asset values through a largely commodified mixed use approach. Most waterfront developments are on land previously used for port or other industrial functions and the relationship between the city and the waterfront sets the scene for waterfront development. This relationship has changed over time in response to the different functions of waterfront areas and the consequent role waterfronts have played in the overall urban environment.

Over the past forty years or so, cities have rediscovered their waterfronts in response to the large amount of vacant land created by the departure of traditional waterfront-based industries, most particularly ship-building, and some (not all) port functions. Waterfronts have become an important strategic aspect of regeneration within neoliberal urbanism, with the space for signature buildings and new commercial and residential developments to help promote the city on the global stage. Although property-based regeneration is often regarded as being led and shaped by the private sector, waterfronts provide an example of how this is not the case. City and national level government provide financial, regulatory and promotional assistance to ensure waterfronts are seen as successful examples of urban growth and dynamism. The analysis of modern waterfronts must therefore take into account the wider urban regeneration discourses of globalism, neoliberalism, competitiveness, creative economies, cultural planning and city marketing.

Waterfront developments have sometimes been criticised for being exclusionary spaces for local residents, due to the emphasis on consumption-based activity and the focus on attracting outside investors, tourists, and potential ‘creative class’ workers. Waterfront heritage is based on manufacturing and port activities which

sustained working-class jobs. This history is often used as a basis for marketing the new waterfront, in a sometimes questionable way, whilst at the same time preventing the descendants of these workers from accessing the benefits. The governance of waterfronts can lead to a bias against the traditional view of public benefit, reinforced by neoliberalised planning policies and weak opportunities for community involvement in decision-making. The same public bodies that are responsible for global marketing can be the ones who need to ensure waterfronts do not become gentrified enclaves with no real connection to the rest of the city.

The future of the urban waterfront needs to be considered in the context of two relatively new factors. First is the aftermath of the economic crisis of the late 2000s, although bearing in mind that the impact was uneven across the world and that some countries have recovered more quickly than others. However, countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and several other members of the European Union’s eurozone, suffered a catastrophic economic downturn with a severe impact on property investment. The second factor is the increasingly evident consequences of climate change, including more frequent severe weather episodes such as storms and flooding.

It is interesting that neither of these items are having a serious impact on models of waterfront development. A lack of investment funding has slowed down some projects and has led to some minor new initiatives such as ‘meanwhile use’, but there has been no call for a major reassessment of the mixed use, profit-led approach. Equally, the wisdom of investing large amounts on developments located at around sea level without meaningful flooding protection is not generally questioned by policy-makers, although it may be of more concern to investors and, in particular, insurance companies. In a changing world, it is necessary to question the sustainability of current waterfront regeneration practices.





## 1.1 Research aims and objectives, research questions and analytical approach

The research aims are to examine current trends, themes and issues in waterfront regeneration and to assess who benefits from such initiatives, through case studies in different UK jurisdictions and in the Republic of Ireland. The research objectives are:

1. To review the relevant literature to contextualise the project, including: waterfront redevelopment; globalisation, neoliberalism and governance; the 'credit crunch' and property development; the economy and society of the UK and the Irish Republic;
2. To carry out original research in four case study waterfront areas: Belfast, Northern Ireland; Liverpool, England; Cardiff, Wales; and Dublin, Republic of Ireland, to include an assessment of the economic and social benefits of the scheme to nearby disadvantaged areas and to the cities as a whole;
3. To analyse the contribution of the research data to the literature on neoliberalism, waterfront redevelopment, and related areas such as city marketing and gentrification, as well as to the body of work on regeneration in divided cities;
4. To consider whether the research evidence points towards a new stage in waterfront development: the restructured 'competitive waterfront'; and
5. To use the theoretical framework to assess 'who benefits' from waterfront redevelopment and to make practical recommendations for the future of such development at a time of economic retrenchment.

The research questions are:

- Has the nature of waterfront development changed in response to the economic downturn? If so, is this change sufficient to be able to theorise a new phase in waterfront development?
- How has neoliberalisation impacted on production, consumption and governance in waterfront areas? Who benefits from waterfront regeneration?
- What is the contribution of private sector-led development to the economic and social health of cities?
- What is the role of the public sector in supporting private investment in difficult economic times?

The analytical approach sets the case study data in the context of waterfronts within neoliberal urbanism, with a particular focus on the role of city competitiveness in driving regeneration priorities. A literature review and a project scoping phase have resulted in a four-part framework for analysis which sets out the components for a potential new addition to Hoyle's waterfront typology (1988; 2000): the 'competitive waterfront'. In addition, questions have been generated to assess the degree of public benefit from the case study waterfronts.

## 1.2 Case studies

A short description of each of the case study areas follows, with further information available in Appendix One, including outputs and expenditure where it has been possible to obtain figures (which in all cases was extremely difficult). In all four cases, port or industrial activity can be traced back to the eighteenth century; however these descriptions cover only the last thirty years or so, since the beginnings of regeneration of the inner port or industrial areas.



Image source: SurangaSL / Shutterstock.com

## The Belfast waterfront

The Belfast waterfront consists of the Laganside and Titanic Quarter development areas. The decline of shipbuilding and the closure of the Belfast Gasworks in 1985 led to dereliction in areas closer to Belfast City Centre by the end of the 1980s, which is when the regeneration of Belfast's waterfront began in earnest. The Laganside Urban Development Corporation (UDC) operated from 1989 until 2007, originally covering 140 hectares fronting the River Lagan but subsequently extended to another 60 hectares of the nearby Gasworks and Cathedral Quarter. Laganside's aim was to regenerate the area 'to the stage where private sector development and investment will continue without major public intervention' (Laganside Corporation, 2007: 2). The original programme was largely concerned with improving infrastructure, attracting private investment, and building offices and apartments for the private market (Fitzsimons, 1995) although in later years some community projects were supported (Sterrett et al, 2005). Private investment was sluggish initially, but picked up after the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (Neill et al, 2014). The Laganside area has been managed by the Department for Social Development since 2007. In 2000, the Odyssey Arena Millennium Project opened, providing a large new entertainment function for the Belfast waterfront.

The 75-hectare Titanic Quarter (TQ) development continued the regeneration from 2001, at a time when the city wished to present itself as a newly peaceful and increasingly cosmopolitan destination for international investment. In 2005 a Development Framework was

issued which claimed TQ's vision was to achieve 'a high profile European waterfront development firmly rooted in the history and character of Belfast, acting as a driver for high quality investment and development in the city' (Turley Associates, 2005: 1). In the same year, the land lease was acquired by Harcourt Developments and its subsidiary, Titanic Quarter Ltd., has continued as developer (the freehold is owned by the Belfast Harbour Commissioners). Phase One, built between 2007 and 2011, included 475 apartments, offices, a new campus for the Belfast Metropolitan College, an hotel and a new site for the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland. In addition, a Science Park had opened in 2002 to provide office space for small high tech businesses on 10 further hectares outwith TQ.

TQ's Phase One was completed during the post-2008 global economic downturn, which had a severe impact on cash flow and hence the speed of development. Phase Two was planned to include more apartments and other mixed uses but it has largely failed to materialise, the exception being the very successful 'Titanic Belfast' museum (Figure 1) and the Titanic Slipway public space, both opened in April 2012. Instead, a more ad hoc approach has been adopted, including an Urban Sports Academy run as a social economy business, and the Titanic Studios for film and television production. In 2014 planning permission was granted for an extension to the studios, along with new office space next to the College; perhaps an indication that prospects for private investment may be improving.




Image source: Deymos.HR /Shutterstock.com

## Cardiff Bay

Redevelopment in Cardiff Bay began in the mid-1980s with the Atlantic Wharf residential, leisure and office development, followed in 1987 by the establishment of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (CBDC). CBDC covered 1100 hectares and its mission statement was: 'To put Cardiff on the international map as a superlative maritime city which will stand comparison with any such city in the world, thereby enhancing the image and economic well-being of Cardiff and Wales as a whole' (CBDC, 1997 in Thomas and Imrie, 1999: 106). Its objectives were: to promote development and provide a superb environment in which people want to live, work and play; to re-unite the city of Cardiff with its waterfront; to bring forward a mix of development which would create a wide range of job opportunities and would reflect the hopes and aspirations of the communities of the area; to achieve the highest standard of design and quality in all types of investment; to establish the area as a recognised centre of excellence and innovation in the field of urban regeneration' (CBDC, 1987 in Punter, 2006: 151). A key feature was the controversial Barrage, opened in 1998 after experiencing delays due to technical difficulties, which created a 200 hectare freshwater lake. Some argued this was at the expense of the natural wildlife habitat (Cowell and Thomas, 2002). CBDC carried out mixed use development of part of the Inner Harbour area until its winding up in 2000.

Although CBDC achieved some impressive outputs (Appendix One, Table B) especially in the areas of housing and job creation, there were delays to several projects which meant that they did not complete until the successor management arrangements were in place. The key successor organisation was Cardiff City Council, including the Cardiff Harbour Authority which continued to manage the Barrage. Other agencies included the Welsh Development Agency, Vale of Glamorgan Council, and the Countryside Council for Wales. There was a separate Butetown Regeneration programme including Communities First and Cardiff Community Housing Association. Signature developments completed in the mid-2000s included Roald Dahl Plass public space in 2000, the Wales Millennium Centre in 2004; and the Senedd (Welsh Government) in 2006. Both the Millennium Centre and the Senedd experienced difficulties: the former was a replacement for an abandoned Opera House project (Thomas and Imrie, 1999), and the latter overspent. Since 2000, the area's main focus has been on entertainment and leisure, with developments including Mermaid Quay, the International Sports Village, the Red Dragon Centre and the Dr Who Experience. The Millennium Centre hosts companies performing opera, ballet and classical music. Residential development continues, including the large new Cardiff Pointe area; the mixed use Port Teigr area includes office development. A new road has been constructed to link the Bay with the City Centre and a metro system has just been announced.



### Dublin Docklands

The Dublin Port and Docks Board issued renewal plans for redevelopment of Dublin's inner docks in 1972, which were poorly received and abandoned (Moore, 2008). Following further debate, active waterfront renewal in Dublin dates from the founding of the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA) in 1987, with the responsibility for developing an area of 30 hectares including the construction of the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). The first phase was opened in 1990 and surrounding development included apartments and cafés. The CHDDA was established along Urban Development Corporation lines and therefore had its own planning powers, and offered tax incentives to commercial and residential investors. Planning schemes were issued in 1987 and 1994.

The IFSC was regarded as important for the country's economic development, but concerns were raised about the lack of local benefit from the Custom House Docks development given that there was a large residential community adjacent to the scheme. Therefore when the CHDDA was replaced by the Dublin Docklands Development Corporation in 1997, the new body was given a wider remit both in terms of land development (526 hectares) and scope. The DDDA's mission statement was to 'develop the Dublin Docklands into a world-class city quarter paragon of sustainable inner city regeneration – one in which the whole community enjoys the highest standards of access to education, employment, housing and social amenity and which delivers a major contribution to the social and economic prosperity of Dublin and the whole of Ireland' (DDDA, 2008: 13). The objectives, set out in legislation, were: 'the social and economic regeneration of the Dublin Docklands area, on a sustainable basis; improvements in the physical environment of the Dublin Docklands Area; and the continued development in the Docklands of services of, for, and in support of, or ancillary to, the financial sector of the economy (DDDA 2008: 17). These principles were reflected

in the DDDA's governance, which as well as a small appointed Board included a larger Council with community, business and state interests all represented.

The DDDA also had planning powers and the ability to offer tax incentives to investors. Masterplans were issued in 1997, 2003 and 2008. Area Action Plans and, later, Area Planning Schemes also helped to break down the large area into manageable areas for remediation and land sales. Notable developments (see also Appendix One, Table C) included two new bridges: the Sean O'Casey footbridge opened in 2005, and the Samuel Beckett Bridge in 2009; the O2 Arena in 2008; the Convention Centre Dublin in 2010 and a number of hotels; and also in 2010 the Bord Gais Energy Theatre located in Grand Canal Square as part of the impressive redevelopment of Grand Canal Dock. An extensive community programme was also put in place including a number of community forums and the construction of the Sean O'Casey Community Centre in 2009. A requirement for residential development to include 20% social or affordable housing was a success and led to the policy being adopted nationwide.

Although Ireland was badly affected by the financial crisis of 2008, the largely publicly funded development was able to continue. However, the fall in land values had a particular impact in the case of one site, the Irish Glass Bottle works, in which DDDA had invested and made a substantial loss. An audit report found conflicts of interest on the Board (C&AG, 2012; Moore-Cherry, 2013) and as a result it was announced that the DDDA would be wound up in 2014; at the time of writing, this is now planned for Spring 2015 as legislation is still in progress. The responsibility for the remaining development of the area will be transferred to Dublin City Council including the designation of a Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) to provide a streamlined planning process for the North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock areas only. Private sector commercial and residential demand is now beginning to increase again.



## The Liverpool waterfront

Regeneration of Liverpool's extensive docks area began with the establishment of the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) in 1981. Liverpool County Council had produced an earlier redevelopment plan but had been unable to implement it, not least due to funding constraints (Couch, 2003). MDC's aim was to use public funds to create the infrastructure to attract private investment, through: 'securing the regeneration of the area; bringing land and buildings back into effective use; encouraging commercial and industrial development; creating an attractive environment that would encourage people to live and work in the area' (Couch, 2003: 121). The initial development plan was allocated as 55% industrial, 40% commercial and residential, and 5% port function, but in reality an ad hoc mixed use approach was adopted due to lack of investment demand (Parkinson, 1988). Projects completed under the MDC included the very successful redevelopment of Albert Dock including Merseyside Maritime Museum and the Tate Liverpool, and the International Garden festival in 1984, which attracted 3.4 million visitors. The festival site remained derelict for many years as plans for a leisure centre were not fulfilled, but more recently the Festival Gardens have opened and work is about to begin on a housing development for 1300 new homes.

The MDC initially covered 350 hectares of largely uninhabited land and its remit was extended to 960 hectares in 1988. The new area included existing communities and this may have driven the more people-centred focus of a new development strategy issued in 1990, which aimed to: 'encourage enterprise, new businesses and help existing businesses to grow; improve people's job prospects, their motivation and skills; create a better environment for residents and businesses; [and] make inner areas more attractive places in which to live and work; market Merseyside to potential investors, businessmen and tourists' (Couch, 2003: 127). MDC's final outputs included 920 housing association homes including the pioneering Eldonians housing co-operative (other outputs in Appendix One, Table D).

The MDC was abolished in 1998 and in 1999 the Liverpool Vision strategic development agency was founded with partners including Liverpool City Council and English Partnerships (now part of the Homes and Communities Agency). Waterfront development has been incorporated into a city-wide development plan and the latest of these identifies three priorities for the waterfront: filling the gaps with new development; connecting each part of the waterfront together as well as improving connection with the city; and 'enlivening' the area through further major capital projects, especially in King's Dock (Liverpool Vision, 2013). Plans have been issued for King's Dock and for Waterspace (South Docks). Projects completed since 1998 include the International Slavery Museum in Albert Dock in 2007, the highly successful Liverpool One shopping centre in 2008 which connects the waterfront with the city centre, in the same year the Echo Arena and BT Convention Centre at King's Dock, the Liverpool Canal Link in 2009 and the distinctive Museum of Liverpool in 2011. Liverpool was the European Capital of Culture in 2008, with 15m visitors to the city and an estimated economic impact of £800m (Boland, 2013).

Much of the Liverpool waterfront along with some other parts of the city was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2004, including the Stanley Dock conservation area, the Pier Head, Mann Island, the Albert and Wapping warehouses, and the Old Dock site. The Heritage Site includes fifteen surviving pre-1850 docks and nine large dockside warehouses (Rodwell, 2008). This changed the context for development, especially when the controversial Liverpool Waters planning application was made by the private developer Peel Holdings, to develop the North Docks following on from their existing regeneration of Princes Dock. A modified version of the application was agreed in 2013. Regeneration in Liverpool does not seem to have suffered from the economic downturn to the same extent as the other three case studies.

## 1.3 Report structure

**Chapter Two** uses a review of the literature on waterfront regeneration and related areas to devise a deductive framework for analysis along with some questions about public benefit.

**Chapter Three** sets out the project's qualitative methodology, which included 33 semi-structured interviews across the four case studies. The chapter also describes previous work undertaken as part of developing the hypothesis, including a scoping phase and several conference presentations. The chapter also sounds a note of caution as follows: The scale of the project did not permit in-depth inquiry into any of the four areas. Equally, this research is not a programme evaluation. It is a qualitative study about perceptions and perspectives which have generated themes and issues for discussion and analysis. Because much previous research on waterfronts has been descriptive, there is an emphasis here on the generation and testing of an analytical framework rather than on providing in-depth information about each of the four case studies.

**Chapter Four** reviews the research findings through exploration of case study narratives about their waterfront regeneration over time, assessment of the 'competitive waterfront' model against case study data, and a report of attitudes towards public benefit.

To conclude, **Chapter Five** an overall assessment and analysis of the 'competitive waterfront' model and the question 'who benefits' in the case study areas, before drawing more general conclusions and making recommendations for further research and for practice.

**Three appendices** provide further information about aspects of the study, including case study profiles, a list of organisations interviewed, and the NVivo nodes used for coding the data.




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## 2.0 Literature review and analytical framework

The renewal of waterfront landscapes as new forms of cosmopolitan living involves the transformation of sites of decay into places of commodified spectacle, oriented towards a high consumption lifestyle (Oakley, 2011) and including items such as luxury apartments and office developments, art galleries and museums (often connected to maritime heritage), sports facilities, restaurants and shopping, and large scale flagship projects. Public open space is usually available and can include access to the waterfront, free events and public art. The funding model is based on the attraction of private investment, but public subsidy is almost always present, for example in provision of transport infrastructure, public realm enhancements such as public art or events, signature buildings, or more hidden support such as benefits through tax breaks or 'fast track' changes to planning policy. Well known examples of waterfront development include: London (Brownill, 2011; Carmona, 2009); Toronto (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008); Melbourne (Sandercock and Dovey, 2002; Shaw, 2013); and Dublin (Moore, 2008; Moore-Cherry and Vinci, 2012). Edited collections such as Malone (1996); Marshall (2001); Hoyle et al (1988), Desfor et al (2011), Hein (2011) and Smith and Garcia Ferrari (2012) have contributed a large number of other useful case studies. There is no shortage of descriptive material about waterfronts, but currently a more theoretically robust approach is becoming evident.

The urban waterfront has been subject to change for hundreds of years (Bunce and Desfor, 2007; Hoyle, 2000), but the characteristics of modern waterfront renewal have been identified as originating in the United States from the 1960s onwards (Bruttomesso, 2001). Baltimore is regarded as 'the first international model for the post-industrial waterfront' (Ward, 2011:74) and the model was copied across the world, leading to the paradox of cities marketing their waterfronts as unique and special places whilst following a common model of development (Norcliffe et al, 1996; Comunian, 2011). The ideological features of waterfront governance, rooted in urban entrepreneurialism, also date from this period. The ideologies and structures of urban governance impact strongly on waterfront priorities. Waterfront sites have long been recognised as 'a key element in the wider process of urban renewal' (Hoyle, 1988:16) and their redevelopment represents a significant strategic opportunity for city branding and marketing. Urban waterfronts have become important sites of capital accumulation, rendering them critical to the bolstering of city competitiveness (Harvey 1989; Oakley, 2011).



Image source: Marbury / Shutterstock.com

This chapter reviews the extensive literature on waterfronts, along with relevant theoretical perspectives, in order to construct a framework for analysis of the research data. The first section reviews neoliberal urbanism as the context for contemporary waterfront development including discussion of neoliberalisation, city competitiveness and urban assemblage as approaches to analysis. It is followed by a review of several previous models of waterfront development, with a focus on Hoyle's typology (1988; 2000) which seems to offer the most potential for development. A new framework for analysis, the 'competitive waterfront', is then proposed, followed by a discussion of the question 'who benefits?' from waterfront development. As with other forms of urban regeneration, waterfront development involves a multitude of actors and interests whose activities should be analysed in their immediate local context and also located within a wider framework encompassing regional, national and global factors. The framework for analysis and questions to assess 'who benefits' were derived from the literature and the project's scoping phase.

### 2.1 Neoliberal urbanism: the context for contemporary waterfront development

Contemporary waterfront development needs to be analysed within the context of wider debates about urban regeneration and renewal within neoliberal urbanism. Neoliberalism is a globally dominant approach to political economy which promotes the superiority of market mechanisms through governance, political strategy, and ideological discourse (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010). State activity is 'rolled back' to focus on support for capital accumulation, supplemented by a 'rolling out' of new governance and regulatory structures (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2004; Keil, 2009). The practice of 'actually existing' neoliberalism is known as neoliberalisation: 'a politically guided intensification of market rule and commodification' (Brenner et al, 2012: 29) with characteristics that vary according to specific economic, social, political and historical factors. The role of the state is likely to vary considerably depending upon the specific actions required to promote market mechanisms and the degree to which these mechanisms are regarded as feasible in particular circumstances (Muir, 2014).

Neoliberal urbanism provides the overarching framework for the modern city (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002), with the remaking and commodification of urban space playing a vital role in maintaining capital accumulation (Smith, 2002). Actually existing neoliberalism, with its paradoxical increase in state intervention and desire to roll-back the welfare state, has led to cities becoming 'strategically central sites in the uneven, crisis-laden

advance of neoliberal restructuring projects' (Peck et al, 2009: 49). The need to compete for mobile capital and labour has changed the nature of urban governance, from being providers and guarantors of welfare provision and supporting infrastructure to being enablers, intermediaries and change agents in pursuit of economic advantage (Harvey, 1989). This involves a mix of state, civil society and market actors and includes public-private partnerships, flagship projects, aggressive marketing and consumption orientated projects. There is an emphasis on governance by 'experts and elites' (Harvey, 2005: 66).

Neoliberalisation has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarisation and a dramatic intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Indeed, the 2007-08 'credit crunch' and subsequent financial crisis had their origins in neoliberal practices such as deregulation and global policy transfer (Gamble, 2009; Harvey, 2010). The financial crisis did not lead to the death of neoliberalism; rather, the emphasis on recovery through economic growth is leading to a greater focus on commodification and profit, led by the private sector and supported as necessary by the state (Brenner et al, 2012; Meyer and Künkel, 2012). Therefore neoliberal urbanism remains the overarching ideological context for the analysis of waterfront development.

### 2.2 City competitiveness

Neoliberalism relies upon global flows of capital, mediated by urban governance through the involvement of the private sector and investment in urban development, the replacement of hierarchical and bureaucratic governance structures by more fluid networks and regimes, and city marketing through reimagining cities as vibrant, diverse and dynamic landscapes (Oakley, 2007). Although interconnected, Oakley's final point is of particular importance. Entrepreneurial governance in the face of global competition 'has led national, regional and local policy-makers to focus upon competitiveness as a key economic tool' (Boland 2007:1021) in a 'somewhat chaotic and ill-defined discourse based on a relatively narrow conception of how regions compete, grow and prosper' (Bristow, 2005: 285; see also Turok, 2004; Bristow, 2005; 2011; Hay, 2012; Boland, 2014). The competitiveness of individual firms and the competitiveness of localities are seen as interdependent, with micro-economics transformed into regional policy (Huggins, 2003), although how this transformation takes place is unclear (Bristow, 2005). The importance of city competitiveness is revealed in the priority attached to competitiveness indices based on, inter alia, the volume of knowledge based industries, productivity, earnings and unemployment statistics (Huggins, 2003). The inevitable outcome of the drive to create competitive advantage is the creation of 'winners' and 'losers' at every spatial scale.

The concept of city marketing has gained increased prominence as a means of enhancing city competitiveness:

*Historically, it involved selling the city's attributes to investors and tourists. During the 1980s and 1990s, place marketing saw the city physically transformed to cater for the needs of external audiences. Cities are conceived as products to be redesigned, commoditized and sold to consumers in a market. In addition, careful re- imaging of the city replaces old and negative images creating a new dynamic place identity ... (Boland, 2013: 253).*

Policy-makers mimic other competitive markets, thus 'branding' the city in an increasingly commodified environment (Kavaratzis, 2007; Lovering, 2007) with activities such as advertising campaigns, flagship projects and the staging of prestigious cultural and sporting events (Boland, 2010; 2013). But city branding processes can be seen as an 'artificial makeover' or 'carnival mask' used to divert attention away from intensifying economic, social and racial polarisation (Garcia 2004; Peel and Lloyd, 2008). This misrepresentation of the reality of life in the city reflects the selectivity and 'fictive spectacle' of city branding as a significant component of 'civic boosterism' (Boland 2013: 16). The rise of city marketing has had a profound impact on spatial planning policy and practice, including urban regeneration and economic development (Parker and Doak, 2012; Brontë, 2012; Boland, 2014). The discourse of market rationality and economic competitiveness now dictates local and regional development (Lovering, 2007) with a significant impact on both the built environment and cultural landscapes. Re-imaging and re-branding into 'world class' globally competitive' cities has led to the physical, symbolic and discursive reconstruction of cityspace (Kavaratzis, 2007; Peel and Lloyd, 2008; Boland, 2013). An understanding of these processes is vital for assessment of governance and power in the modern city and consequently also in waterfront developments.

## 2.3 Urban assemblage

The need to understand the variegated consequences of neoliberal urbanism at local level in the post-financial crisis era has led to new approaches to analysis over the past few years. One example is the closer examination of micro and meso level social processes such as power and governance through urban assemblage, a way of analysing process and change through bringing together the disparate factors of complex projects to examine how they interact in a particular case (McCann and Ward, 2011; McFarlane, 2011). An assemblage approach emphasises the importance of context and also of agency:

*... seeing assemblage as a process highlights the inherently messy, contestable and contingent nature of the governance of projects – entailing practices such as managing contradictions and attempting to bring various stakeholders into the assemblage – rather than seeing their spread as unstoppable and driven by a powerful logic. Hence such projects are open to challenge; for example, publics can either be reconstituted to populate the recreated waterfront landscapes or they can resist (Brownill, 2013: 51)*

The emphasis on agency assists with examination of 'the contingent, multiple, and context-specific ways in which urban politics are reshaped' (McGuirk, 2012: 259) whilst avoiding an over-deterministic approach which places too much importance on the macro level context of neoliberalism. Local and global processes interact, and change over time. However, Brenner et al (2011) are more critical, stating that assemblage does not pay enough attention to structure and needs to be linked to other theories and frameworks in order to be effective (see also Oakley, 2014a). The 'competitive waterfront' framework for analysis (Figure 4) set out later in this chapter proposes a multi-level approach to the analysis of contemporary waterfronts which takes into account both the principles of assemblage and the importance of retaining an overview connected to neoliberal urbanism.



Image source: Paul J Martin /Shutterstock.com

**Table 1** Hoyle’s typology of waterfront development

Stage	Period	Characteristics
1. Primitive port and city	Ancient and medieval – 19th cent.	• Port near to the city and trade link important for city prosperity
2. Expanding port and city	19th – early 20th cent.	• Rapid growth of port function; ports develop beyond city
3. The modern industrial port	Mid-20th century	• Separation of port and city: containerisation, industrial functions, roll on–roll off ships
4. Retreat from the waterfront	1960s – 1980s	• Further separation – growth of both port and industrial areas away from the city; deep water
5. Redevelopment of the waterfront	1970s – 1990s	• Older waterfront areas become derelict due to departure of port functions: renewal of these sites begins including attempt to integrate with city
6. Renewal of port and city links	1980s – 2000+	• Promotion of ‘liveability’ and multiple functions for older waterfront areas in globalised age – further integration with rest of city

Source: Hoyle [1988; 2000].

## 2.4 Models of waterfront development

Most waterfront developments are situated on land previously used for port or industrial functions. The role and characteristics of urban waterfronts have evolved over time in response to changing economic, technological, political and social conditions. Much of the literature on waterfronts has been primarily descriptive until recently, showing the development of a generic, global model through policy transfer (Brownill, 2013; Ward, 2011). However, there are some broader models of waterfront development, and three are reviewed here.

First, Hoyle’s typology of waterfront development (Figure 3) divides the relationship between the waterfront and the city into six phases dating from ancient times to the end of the 20th century, with port function as the key determinant.

Until the nineteenth century, cities grew up around the port and the trade link was important for prosperity. From the nineteenth to the early twentieth century, rapid growth of the port function caused ports to develop beyond the city. In the mid-20th century, the growth of industrial functions and the need for more space (for example for container ships and larger ferries) led to greater spatial separation of the port from the city. This trend continued in the period 1960s-80s, labelled by Hoyle the ‘retreat from the waterfront’ in which both port and industrial area developed in more peripheral areas. The gradual move outwards left derelict sites closer to the city, however, which from the 1970s onwards were the target of urban renewal, a process that became more widespread from the 1980s onwards and led to greater re-integration between these older port areas and the rest of the city.

Secondly, Shaw’s (2001) less specific but widely cited four-stage model concentrates on the period from the 1960s until the turn of the century. From the 1960s to 1980s, masterplanned developments led and subsidised

by government prevailed, for example Baltimore in the USA. The 1980s and 1990s saw greater use of public-private partnerships and more flexible development plans, overseen by special purpose organisations, to implement similar multi-purpose redevelopment, such as London Docklands (Brownill, 2011). A third stage, from the 1990s, consisted of the widening of the waterfront redevelopment models to smaller cities and towns but with similar characteristics. Developments starting after the early 1990s recession are identified as a fourth stage.

A third, more recent contribution comes from Galland and Hansen (2012). It is concerned specifically with the role of planning in waterfront development, and traces four ideal types:

- i. Public investment planning, led and funded by the public sector and with the aim of benefiting the public interest. It is plan-led and takes place in areas where the market is not strong.
- ii. Regulative planning, in which the public sector sets a governance framework based on achieving consensus through public participation and implemented by planning professionals. It takes place in areas of strong market demand and the public interest remains an important goal although private sector interests are also considered.
- iii. Trend planning is described as a reaction to the weakness of regulative planning. It includes facilitation of private development, with the adaptation of a planning system to suit market demand and the key interests considered being those of private developers. It occurs in strong market conditions. The authors regard this and the next category as neoliberalised planning.
- iv. Leverage planning, where state funds are used to attract private investment within a public-private partnership framework in areas with market potential: ‘the public sector plays the role of putting forward strong initiatives and as an enabler of development. However, the private sector is seen as the main driver for change’ (p.209).

Although the four types are not considered to occur in chronological order, the authors regard the third and fourth categories as neoliberalised planning systems. Arguably the fourth category is the most common in today's waterfront development environment.

### Assessment of the models

Hoyle's typology has the advantage of acknowledging the long history of the use of waterfront land and its relationship with the city. It does, however concentrate solely on function, omitting governance processes and much context. Recent stages overlap to reflect different port narratives, but the arrival of greater integration with the city by the end of the twentieth century appears accurate. Shaw's most valuable contribution was to distinguish the first two stages of masterplanned developments and more flexible development plans, although these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Stage three appears very similar to stage two, and the impact of the early 1990s recession was not as significant as it appeared at the time, thus rendering his fourth stage superfluous. Galland and Hansen's planning-based ideal types provide an important process-oriented contribution which helps us to understand the respective roles of the public and private sectors and whose interests the public sector serves under the different categories.

This research will utilise both Hoyle's and Galland and Hansen's models, in different ways. As Hoyle's typology needs updating, this research asks whether a new phase can be added: the 'competitive waterfront', which comprises development of the natural waterfront environment along lines consistent with the neoliberalised competitive city, perhaps with little or no difference in functions between the waterfront and the rest of the urban environment. Galland and Hansen's model is considered most useful to assist with answering the question 'who benefits?'. It provides some explanation for the disappearance of the concept of the public interest in neoliberalised planning, and will be used in that context.

## 2.5 The 'competitive waterfront': a framework for analysis

Urban waterfronts have become places of significant change, increasingly affected by global transformation processes and broader urban restructuring (Kokot 2008). The contemporary urban waterfront both reflects and constitutes changes in governance, economic regulation, and societal imaginaries. It is a territory of scalar interconnection and networks of social, ecological, economic and political processes (Bunce and Desfor 2007), all of which are highly influential and need to be reflected in any proposed new phase of waterfront regeneration analysis. Furthermore, a new analysis requires an understanding that the spatial relationship between the city and the waterfront is not straightforward and is often contested, because redevelopment 'occurs at the problematic and controversial interface between port function and the broader urban environment' (Hoyle, 2000: 395).

This section develops the concept of the 'competitive waterfront' as an extension of Hoyle's typology. Table 1 sets out a detailed four-part structure which is derived from the literature and from the scoping phase of the research. It is a deductive typology against which data from the case studies will be analysed through an assemblage approach, in order to test its validity.

### The ideological framework

The first category of the framework concerns the ideological framework of neoliberal urbanism and city competitiveness, as discussed earlier in the chapter. This drives the capital accumulation through the creation of spaces for consumption and production, including the financialisation of public assets and services, within a globalised context (Sairinen and Kumpulainen 2006). The neoliberalisation of waterfront development has been noted by, amongst others, Scharenberg and Bader (2009), Neill (2011), Oakley (2011), Moore-Cherry (2013), Muir (2013) and Shaw (2013); the uneven application of neoliberal principles and the continuing important role of the state is also acknowledged (Heeg, 2011; Rubin, 2011).



Waterfront sites offer considerable development potential, with their large amounts of land in a potentially attractive setting, including space for prestigious and iconic projects to enhance city status (Hoyle, 1988; Chang and Huang, 2011; Scharenberg and Bader, 2009; Cowen and Bunce, 2006). Cities attempt to develop their waterfronts in ways that attract business, investment and professionals and convince their own residents and entrepreneurs to remain. It is therefore imperative to connect waterfront redevelopment in a broader context of urban strategies that use the built environment as a prerequisite in preparing cities for competition (Heeg 2011).

The convergence of cultural, tourist, retail and residential functions testifies to a city's vitality and attainment of world-class status (Bruttomesso, 2001; Chang and Huang 2011; Ward, 2011). Commodification occurs through 'the restructuring of place and people and the privatisation of the waterfront through selling housing, business locations and leisure' (Oakley, 2011: 222). Such new uses for the waterfront have often been promoted using its history as a resource for city marketing (Bruttomesso 2001). Examples include Boston's Faneuil Market Place and San Francisco's Ghirardelli Square (Shaw 2001; Rubin, 2011; Heeg, 2011), Port Adelaide (Rofe and Oakley, 2006), Melbourne (Sandercock and Dovey, 2002; Shaw, 2013) and Belfast's Titanic Quarter (Neill, 2011; Coyles, 2013). In a globalised world, waterfronts offer the opportunity to signal a more local identity; and 'they have developed a structure that is pretty well universally applicable while at the same time capable of being adapted for local consumption' (Shaw 2001: 163).

Therefore the features we would expect to find within a 'competitive waterfront' ideological approach include: a market-led and commodified approach to development include a priority given to private sector interests; intensive marketing of waterfront facilities, either as part of city branding or as an individual destination location and with the inclusion of private sector incentives for investment; and a particular emphasis on development features seen as unique, particularly area's maritime history.

### Governance

The second category of the framework is about governance. The structures and processes of decision-making in waterfront development brings together the ideological approach of category 1 and the physical resources of category 3. In the UK, the example of the Urban Development Corporations of the 1980s was strong in creating a form of partnership governance with strong input from the public and private sectors and with less community involvement (Imrie and Thomas, 1999; Brownill, 2011). The influence of UDCs has also been identified in Dublin (Moore, 2008). They created a new form of governance based on an amalgam of free enterprise and deregulated decision making. Central to this, UDCs (except Belfast's Laganside) were able to avoid local government's statutory planning processes which were seen as being at the centre of urban decay

in British cities. Network governance structures with a prominent role for the private sector have also been identified elsewhere (Galland and Hansen, 2012) and Oakley (2011: 223) refers to 'hybrid forms of governance' which channel public sector resources into the promotion of economic growth and reliance on the private sector to deliver projects, for example through public-private partnerships (McGuirk, 2000; Bunce and Desfor, 2007). Although the nature of partnerships and the objectives of waterfront regeneration can change over time (Brownill, 2011; Shaw, 2013), the fundamental reliance on the private sector remains. This has been accompanied by an integration of private real estate actors and their interests into urban planning (Heeg 2011) as developers within globalising cities have focused on dilapidated areas, such as redundant docklands, with the potential to be turned into prime real estate (Scharenberg and Bader, 2009).

The role and activity of local communities in waterfront regeneration is generally regarded in the literature as marginal or oppositional. In some cases there is a question about who the 'community' is, when redevelopment takes place on brownfield land which was previously uninhabited (Muir, 2013). More commonly, there is some kind of surrounding residential use, leading to struggles over competing interests. Examples of marginal influence during consultation processes have occurred in Toronto (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008) and Cardiff (Raco 2000; Cowell and Thomas, 2002) with the latter involving a small business association rather than local residents. Race (2000: 591) comments that: 'participation may succeed only in securing limited objectives while at the same time symbolically legitimating policy-making processes without securing any fundamental concessions'. Equally, in Singapore, Chang and Huang (2011) note that local residents have concerns over the fate of public life and identity in the city, for example the privatisation of urban spaces, loss of vernacular architecture and the diminution of local identification with places (see also Oakley and Johnson, 2013, on the meaning of land and water for Indigenous Australian people and its removal from modern Australian waterfront regeneration practice).

Oppositional community activity may be defined as resistance taking place outside designated structures, which attempts to establish a counterhegemonic position in order to bring about change. It is less common than marginal activity, however examples include opposition to the London Docklands in the 1980s (Brownill, 2011); Philadelphia in the mid 2000s (McGovern, 2008) and Berlin in the late 2000s, where Scharenberg and Bader (2009) claim that it is important to analyse social movements in order to understand urban regeneration processes. However, there are also rarer occasions when the opinions of communities are more mixed, including positive elements. Examples include Rotterdam (Doucet et al, 2011) and Dublin (Doucet and Duignan, 2012; Moore-Cherry and Vinci, 2012). The example of Dublin is particularly striking because the development authority has recently been abolished following allegation of mismanagement and corruption (Moore-Cherry, 2013).

Certainly, the scoping phase of this research found more complex attitudes to the developments than expected, with evidence of civic pride in some cases.

Finally, the governance of public space includes the control of public behaviour. Cowen and Bunce (2006) and Bunce and Desfor (2007) note increased security provisions since the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001. As the private sphere expands into the public realm there is more use of CCTV, security guards and enhanced lighting. This is often to enhance the attractiveness and appeal of areas to investors, tourists and potential new residents of the ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002). However, such measures may also exclude poorer, working class, minority ethnic, homeless and young people (Cowen and Bunce 2006; Rubin, 2011). Raco (2007: 309) comments that ‘a perceived absence of security will undermine a place’s competitiveness and attractiveness and inhibit the successful implementation of broader policy agendas’.

Therefore the features we would expect to find within a ‘competitive waterfront’ governance approach include: a partnership approach with a focus on public/private partnerships and adding value. Public subsidy may be substantial, for example provision of infrastructure, but with an emphasis on an economic return through attracting private sector investment. Community involvement is not necessarily absent, but it is tightly controlled by actors in other sectors and the contribution of communities to change may be marginal unless they adopt a highly labour intensive oppositional stance. However, it would be mistaken to assume that waterfront regeneration is always viewed negatively by surrounding residents and local businesses. Equally, the control of public behaviour and access may exclude some groups but may be welcomed by others.

**Table 2** The ‘competitive waterfront’ framework for analysis

Analytical category	Empirical factors (what we would expect to find)
<p><b>1. Ideological framework:</b> The characteristics of neoliberal urbanism, city competitiveness and branding: creating spaces for consumption and production.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Market-led development and commodification: financialisation and economic opportunities</li> <li>Public/private balance in favour of private sector</li> <li>Waterfront promoted as part of city marketing and branding; or as individual location. Private sector investment incentives offered</li> <li>Unique factors of the city’s waterfront.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Governance:</b> bringing together ideology and use of space – including planning policy in a ‘post politics’ environment; impact of urban regimes.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Public sector investment focus on economic development and added value including some community gain</li> <li>Private sector involvement in decision-making and use of public subsidy e.g. PPPs, TIF</li> <li>Partnerships between public and private sectors (sometimes also involving community); some blurring of boundaries in terms of functions</li> <li>Community input marginalised or tightly controlled; but usually evidence of some community benefit</li> <li>Planning policy enables flexible development options in order to maximise private profit</li> <li>Spaces of resistance; counterhegemonic practices</li> <li>Control of public behaviour e.g. CCTV, security staff.</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. The physical, social and economic environment:</b> use of space [water frontage and large amounts of vacant land]</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provision of:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Spectacle – ‘flagship’ projects e.g. signature buildings, large public events</li> <li>Leisure provision: arts, sport, museums, open space</li> <li>High value housing</li> <li>Economic development of various kinds e.g. office, retail, education facilities, small scale manufacturing</li> <li>[Rarely] environmental features/conservation</li> </ul> </li> <li>Public access: control and commodification of space e.g. entry charges, fenced and gated areas</li> <li>Public benefit often via state regulation or funding e.g. social or affordable housing, free public space, free events; promotion of shared space.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Connectivity:</b> The joining up of the waterfront with the rest of the city (and farther afield)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Physical links with the rest of the city and elsewhere, e.g. transport infrastructure and services, bridges</li> <li>Functional links: same activities as the rest of the city</li> <li>Marketing and branding: part of the city ‘offer’</li> <li>Technological links: quality of broadband</li> <li>Connectivity ‘of the mind’: perceptions of waterfront location in relation to the rest of the city.</li> </ul>

### Use of space

The third category of the framework concerns the use of land and water to create the physical, social and economic environment of a specific development, along with the control of public access to that space and the public benefits that are generated from it. (Public benefit is discussed more extensively in the next section of this chapter.) Despite the location of waterfronts at a time of rising sea levels, there is a surprising lack of attention paid to environmental management in the literature; it is possible that this may change as the issue gains a higher profile with policy-makers and thus generates more funded research. The importance of urban design is paramount due to its modern connection with city marketing and economic development (Sandercock and Dovey, 2002; Gospodini, 2002). The scoping interviews for this project found that urban design could be used to create either cohesion or segregation, through the impact of, for example, signature buildings, public space and events, access to entertainment, leisure facilities and housing. The use of public subsidy to improve access and cohesion was crucial.

The amount of space available on waterfronts lends itself to 'mega' or 'flagship' projects, which also assist with city marketing and commodification. The term may apply either to a large-scale development characterised by mixed use (housing, retail, office and cultural facilities), a variety of financing techniques, and a combination of public and private sector initiators (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008) or to large, 'signature' buildings of architectural distinctiveness if not always distinction, designed primarily to attract investors and tourists (Doucet et al, 2011; Heeg, 2011). Flagship projects reveal the localised economic and social changes occurring within cities as they respond to competitive, globalising pressures (Oakley 2011). Using the example of Toronto. Lehrer and Laidley (2008) identify these projects as having two objectives: to establish 'world class culture' in the city; and to attract the 'creative class' (Florida, 2002) that is considered key for the success of a contemporary knowledge-based economy:

*The primary argument, made as much in Toronto as in many other cities is that, through an array of massive, concentrated and concerted building activities, cities will be integrated into the international property and finance market and/or global socio-cultural networks. Hence by using the mega-project, cities can actively reposition themselves within the global economy (p.798).*

There are many well-known examples of flagship developments (e.g. London's Canary Wharf, Baltimore's Inner Harbour, Hamburg's HafenCity) and individual buildings (e.g. Sydney's Opera House, Bilbao's Guggenheim Museum, Titanic Belfast). Flagship buildings are often linked to arts and culture, and flagship projects often include a creative element such as media, technology or knowledge-based activity (Gospodini, 2002). Doucet et al (2011) highlight seven major goals of today's flagship projects: image enhancement, acting as catalysts for further growth, tourist attraction, gentrification, prestige, trickledown benefits, and direct social benefits such as improved infrastructure and housing. However, it has also been said that flagships reinforce the social and spatial divisions in a city, and Doucet et al (2011) argue that flagships must be understood within the wider context of gentrification. Peck (2005) points out that this analysis results in the reframing of gentrification as a positive process under neoliberal urbanism.

Although gentrification affects all aspects of an area's activity, it is most concentrated on the type of housing available. Waterfronts financial profiles are oriented towards private sector return on investment, which leads to housing targeted at higher income brackets as a way to 'recolonize' and 'secure' elite spaces (Cowen and Bunce, 2006). Norcliffe et al (1996) note that in a few instances social housing has been included in such developments, but more commonly waterfront land excludes the working class. One exception is Dublin, where an agreement to provide 20 per cent social housing is a rare example of effective community pressure (Moore, 2008; plus the scoping phase of this research). More common are experiences in Auckland New Zealand (Murphy, 2008) and Port Adelaide, Australia (Oakley, 2014b), where islands of revanchist 'luxury' housing have been created. Chang and Huang (2011) describe how, in Singapore, low-cost housing was demolished to make way for an entertainment complex: 'Cosmopolitan sites which welcome the public, also define a 'public' that is limited and limiting' (p.2096).

The scale of waterfronts' land and access to water lends itself to mixed use development, and there is a vast descriptive literature providing examples, as listed at the start of this chapter. An example of project scale is provided from Toronto, where the development plans included: \$17 billion total investment over 30 years; 194,000 person years of employment; 30,000 new full-time jobs; 40,000 new residential units, 7.6 million square feet of new commercial space; and 500 acres of new and improved parks and recreational areas (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008: 794). The scoping phase of this research confirmed other claims that heritage issues were important in relation to the character and identity of the development (e.g. Sepe, 2013; Neill et al, 2014b) as well as far city marketing as discussed earlier in the chapter – although the presentation of history can be contested and access can be restricted, for example by high museum admission charges.

The attraction of cruise tourists through the construction of cruise terminals is of increasing importance, and another example of the unique use of large amount of space along with a water frontage (McCarthy and Romein, 2012)

Therefore the features we would expect to find within a 'competitive waterfront' use of space would be driven by water frontage and availability of large tracts of vacant land, some of which would be contaminated from past industrial use and expensive to remediate. Both land and water can be used to create an attractive public realm environment including the use of 'flagship' signature buildings. Waterfront development is generally mixed use within a financial framework based on the accumulation of private profit, which leads to commodification of facilities and an emphasis on added value activities unless state subsidy or regulation is able to dictate a wide public benefit. Public access to facilities may therefore be restricted, for example by high admission charges but also by denial of spatial access, say in the case of gated apartment complexes.

## Connectivity

The fourth and final category of the framework involve the essential role of various kinds of connectivity for waterfront development. We found this to be an extremely important finding from the scoping stage of the research. Connectivity is arguably the Achilles Heel of waterfronts. The physical connection or separation of waterfronts from their wider urban environment, as a consequence of function, forms the basis of Hoyle's typology (Hoyle, 1988; 2000). And yet, much academic literature does not focus on its importance and visits to waterfront sites often show that, whatever the good intentions of planners, there is poor quality linkage with the rest of the city. An example is Toronto, where pedestrian access from the CBD is under the Gardiner Expressway and involves crossing several busy roads – an issue not mentioned by Lehrer and Laidley (2008). However, Carmona (2009) describes the massively inadequate transport provision in the early years of Canary Wharf in London Docklands; and Coyles (2013) criticises access to Belfast's Titanic Quarter due to the roads system that divides the development from the city centre. A more positive example occurs in Hamburg, where Sepe (2013) describes plans to improve pedestrian and cycle facilities between Hafencity and central Hamburg as well as new public transport links. Much of the difficulty with physical connectivity may come from location – and a waterfront area can be located quite close to the city and still lack well developed connections, or suffer from barriers such as a main road. But another factor may be the need for public subsidy to construct expensive infrastructure such as roads or bridges, or to provide a revenue subsidy for public transport. Airport access is also important for international connectivity and competitiveness. Good urban design is important for conceptualising physical links and for planning when they can and should be included in strategic redevelopment plans.

Other aspects of connectivity listed in Figure 4 are less obvious, but all are important if waterfront areas are to achieve full connectivity with other urban areas as hypothesised in the 'competitive waterfront' model. Connectivity of functions is implied in mixed use waterfront planning, for example office, retail, residential, and arts and leisure activities. These function may be carried out in different ways, for example in more modern offices or in signature buildings rather than established municipal destinations, but the categorical similarities in a wide range of waterfront case studies lend credence to the hypothesis. Integration through city marketing is, again, implied rather than stated, although there may be some tension between marketing of the waterfront area and the rest of the city, especially in an economic downturn. The need for high level technological connectivity, such as broadband and use of social media, appears to be taken for granted in the literature.

A further aspect of connectivity has become a particular interest in this research. We call this connectivity 'of the mind'. How is the waterfront perceived in relation to the rest of the city? – as a place apart or as a city district? This is partly about whether people identify with the waterfront heritage and also about whether waterfronts can successfully develop a sense of place (Sepe, 2013). But it is also about the perception of distance. As we found in the scoping phase of this research, physical proximity does not necessarily mean a social and psychological connection to the area. If the population regard the waterfront as a distant destination, its facilities will not be used by local people. In such circumstances, a waterfront area may become a globalised enclave populated by tourists and transient workers, and its integration into the rest of the city will ultimately fail. The features we expect to find within a 'competitive waterfront' model will be many and varied, but will all point towards a framing of the waterfront as a city district rather than as a place apart.

## 2.6 Who benefits from waterfront development?

Whether or not the 'competitive waterfront' is found to be an empirical reality, the question 'who benefits from waterfront development remains relevant. As we have set out in this chapter, analysis of the modern urban waterfront is connected to broader discourses shaping urban renewal. Therefore it is important to ask: whose interests shape the waterfront and who has the 'right to the city'? (LeFebvre 1996; Scharenberg and Bader 2009). As McGovern (2008: 295) states: 'The key question is not whether to redevelop urban waterfronts, but how they should be developed. For what purpose? For whose benefit?'

While the diversity of the 'new waterfront' seems to offer opportunity for all, it can be argued that its reality forecloses upon a variety of social practices; often reproducing rather than resolving urban inequality and disenfranchisement (Kokot, 2008; Brontë, 2012). In the governance of neoliberal urbanism there is an emphasis on the involvement and influence of private sector actors and capital (Heeg, 2011; Bunce and Desfor, 2007). In this environment, private sector interests can have much more influence compared with civil society actors such as social housing advocates, anti-poverty activists, community organisations and members of the local polity. This trend has also been assisted by the tendency for waterfronts to be managed by either public sector arms' length organisations with appointed boards of directors – for example in Melbourne (Shaw, 2013) and Dublin (Moore, 2008) – or by the private sector, as in Belfast's Titanic Quarter (Muir, 2013). But the possibility of agency remains (Scharenberg and Bader, 2009). Waterfront areas are socially constructed and socially mediated amalgams of meaning, value and memory solidified in the built environment (Rofe and Oakley 2006). For Kokot (2008), dockland communities in particular keep a close relationship to their history and traditions, emphasising a working class identity relating to the industrial ports, the docks and the river.

### What is 'the public interest?'

An exploration of the question 'who benefits?' involves discussion of the meaning of 'the public interest' in waterfront development. The 'public interest' has many meanings and is hard to define. In some cases it is interpreted as an individual benefit and in others a collective gain. Stone (1988:15) notes that 'there is virtually never full agreement on the public interest', however, she argues that 'we might think of the public interest as those things desired by the public-spirited side of citizens'. The 'public interest' is an objective of planning policy, and in the UK it is enshrined in statute and policy guidance.

Yet, as argued earlier, planning is contained within and constrained by urban governance based on civic entrepreneurialism, with profound implications for the spatial planning agenda (Harvey, 1989; Lovering, 2007).

Oakley (2011) suggests that these changes have resulted in an alteration to the concept of public benefit, from a production of a collective benefit to one in which individual members of the public enjoy some kind of gain. A particular aspect of this individualisation of the public interest is seen in the management of space, in particular the exclusion of those who are unable to participate in commodification. For example, the creation of high-income residential communities serves as a way to 'recolonize' and 'secure' waterfront areas, with substantial public money often facilitating the extension of primarily elite spaces (Cowen and Bunce, 2006; Hagerman, 2007). Sandercock and Dovey (2002: 153) discuss how the concept of the public interest can be used by powerful actors:

*The public interest relies upon a broad exploration of alternatives and a rich urban imagination as a prerequisite to informed debate. However, this exploration is a highly political, discursive practice in which the potential for manipulation, seduction and legitimation should not be underestimated.*

A reworking of the concept of the 'public good' has been detected in Toronto, where:

*... the traditional processes of public policy creation on the waterfront – wherein the democratic structures of local government set the vision for redevelopment – have essentially been privatised, giving a small group of globally networked, local private-sector actors with finance capital and real estate development ties the ability to realise their vision and, in the process, reconstitute notions of the public good (Lehrer and Laidley, 2008: 796).*

And also in Portland, Oregon, where the complexity of a mixed use waterfront development resulted in some public gains but at the expense of others:

*The use of public money is justified in order to secure a public good in the form of ecological restoration and green space of the waterfront, but discussion of the greenway has been used to shape expectations and soften criticism of other aspects of the development plans, such as views blocked by new condominium towers, increased traffic congestion, lack of schools or services, little planned affordable housing, relocation of social services for the homeless and the creation of exclusive areas for marginalised populations (Hagerman, 2007: 293).*

The individualisation of the idea of 'public benefit' leaves the way open to argue that, for example, the construction of expensive apartments blocks on previous derelict grounds is a public benefits because purchasers experience the benefits of a new home as well as the improved surrounding environment. It also dilutes the focus of public benefit away from those in most need of it. From this, it is a minor step to conclude that the interests of the private sector will inevitably lead to consequential public benefit. Galland and Hansen (2012) show this in their four-stage model of the role of planning in waterfront development: public-investment planning seeks to revitalise depressed areas in the public interest; regulative planning intends to benefit the public through mediating the demands of land and property owners in a strong market context; trend planning facilitates the interests of private developers in a strong market; and leverage planning encourages a response from private interests to a market with potential. To conclude, without very specific structural and ideological commitment, the concept of collective public benefit disappears from waterfront development.

### Questions about public benefit

This research plans to assess 'who benefits' from waterfront redevelopment, which is particularly important at a time of economic retrenchment. The literature leads us to believe that the wider public, especially those without economic power, may benefit least; and that private sector interests will be facilitated as a priority in order to maximise financial gain. Community interests will be manipulated although small gains may also be made. However, these conclusions need to be assessed against our qualitative case study findings.

Therefore four questions have been generated from the literature review and scoping phase in order to make that assessment:

1. **Conceptualisation:** What is the understanding of 'public benefit'?
2. **Type:** How do the public benefit?
3. **Role:** Who is responsible for the delivery of public benefit?
4. **Distribution:** Which groups benefit most and least?

## 2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has utilised the extensive literature on waterfront development to review the context of neoliberalised urbanism and city competitiveness and to examine some models of waterfront regeneration. The literature paints an overall picture of waterfronts as commodified and exclusive places governed by unaccountable elites, with public benefit provided largely through state intervention through public subsidy or regulation. But is this true in practice? An original framework for analysis of the research data was constructed, to assess whether a new stage of waterfront development may be added to Hoyle's typology. The deductive 'competitive waterfront' framework was based on literature and on the results of the project scoping phase. It constructs a hypothesis about where waterfronts may be going, which was then tested through empirical research in the four case study areas. In addition, a series of questions has been developed to assess the degree of public benefit from waterfront development. Again, the literature points to a very skewed distribution of benefits but this needs to be tested in practice.



Image source: Patryk Kosmider / Shutterstock.com

## 3.0 Methodology

This chapter describes the project's research strategy and design, research methods and research process. To recapitulate, the research aim is to examine current trends, themes and issues in waterfront regeneration and to assess who benefits from such initiatives, through case studies in different UK jurisdictions and in the Republic of Ireland. The research objectives (the steps which allow us to meet the research aim) are:

1. To review the relevant literature to contextualise the project, including: waterfront redevelopment; globalisation, neoliberalism and governance; the 'credit crunch' and property development; the economy and society of the UK and the Irish Republic;
2. To carry out original research in four case study waterfront areas: Belfast, Northern Ireland; Liverpool, England; Cardiff, Wales; and Dublin, Republic of Ireland, to include an assessment of the economic and social benefits of the scheme to nearby disadvantaged areas and to the cities as a whole;
3. To analyse the contribution of the research data to the literature on neoliberalism, waterfront redevelopment, and related areas such as city marketing and gentrification, as well as to the body of work on regeneration in divided cities;
4. To consider whether the research evidence points towards a new stage in waterfront development: the restructured 'competitive waterfront'.
5. To use the theoretical framework to assess 'who benefits' from waterfront redevelopment and to make practical recommendations for the future of such development at a time of economic retrenchment.

The original research questions (to aid analysis) are:

- Has the nature of waterfront development changed in response to the economic downturn? If so, is this change sufficient to be able to theorise a new phase in waterfront development?
- How has neoliberalisation impacted on production, consumption and governance in waterfront areas? Who benefits from waterfront regeneration?
- What is the contribution of private sector-led development to the economic and social health of cities?

Following the scoping phase of the research it was decided to add another research question:

- What is the role of the public sector in supporting private investment in difficult economic times?

The scoping phase results also led to a change in the Belfast case study area: expanded from Titanic Quarter only, to include the entire Belfast waterfront, consisting of both Titanic Quarter and the previous Laganside development.

### 3.1 Research strategy and design

The research is qualitative, and the **research strategy** adopts an interpretivist epistemology and a critical realist ontological stance. This approach acknowledges that we are researching an external reality – waterfront regeneration – but also that research participants have different perspectives on events and it is up to the research team to interpret the research field in the light of sometimes confusing and contradictory empirical evidence (Snape and Spencer, 2003). The research was divided into two phases, the scoping phase and the principal phase. The data, gained primarily through semi-structured interviews, was categorised into themes and issues and then interpreted using a framework for analysis to assess the viability of the concept of the 'competitive waterfront'. The categories in the deductive framework for analysis were generated from the literature on waterfront development, neoliberalism and associated topic areas, as set out in the previous chapter (Figure 4). Material from the project's scoping phase was also useful here. A separate set of questions was used to address the complex issue of who benefits from waterfront development, with analysis in this case derived mainly from empirical evidence.

The project adopted a **multiple case study research design**, involving four case studies: Belfast, Northern Ireland; Liverpool, England; Cardiff, Wales; and Dublin, Republic of Ireland. The case studies cover four of the five jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Short profiles have been provided in Chapter One and more detail in Appendix One. A case study approach is suitable because, following Yin (2003), each case study explores the phenomenon of waterfront development within its context, in a situation where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are indistinct and where multiple sources of evidence are used.

The waterfront is an archetypal case study 'bounded system' (Stake, 1995: 2) in which data can be contextualised and where the depth and richness of data that can be obtained provides a solid basis for theorising. The findings from the four case studies will be 'generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations...' (Yin, 2003: 10) according to Yin's concept of 'analytic generalization' which proposes that general points and principles can be compared between case studies, perhaps linked by a theoretical or analytical framework as has been done in this research.

### 3.2 Research methods

The primary research method was semi-structured interviews, supplemented by site visits and document reviews in the case study areas. Semi-structured interviews involve the following of an interview schedule but the interviewer may vary the order of the questions and may ask supplementary questions to gain additional information (Bryman, 2004). Semi-structured interviews are ideal for obtaining the most appropriate information from a wide variety of participants who may have different areas of knowledge and expertise, as was the case in this research. The interview schedules provided guidance, however in some cases respondents gave full and interesting answers to a narrower range of the questions within the time available, usually between one and one and a half hours.

A total of 33 interviews were carried out: seven in the scoping phase and 26 in the principal phase. Table 3 shows the balance between public, private and community/voluntary sector and Table 4 shows that the total number

of interviews per case study area varied from six to eleven. The community/voluntary sector was less well represented and the slightly higher number of public sector interviews was partly due to the inclusion of wholly owned government organisations and politicians in this category.

A list of organisations represented by those interviewed appears in Appendix Two although in some cases the organisations have been anonymised at the request of participants. In two case studies, Belfast and Cardiff, the total number of contacts was slightly higher than the number of interviews because in each case two interviews were held with two people; in Dublin total contacts were one less than the number of interviews because one participant was interviewed in both the scoping and principal phases. Interview data was supplemented by site visits and document reviews. Information gathering in the case studies proved to be more difficult than anticipated and may explain why much literature on waterfronts does not provide systematic or detailed factual information, for example on project expenditure.

**Table 3** Interviews by project phase

Sector	Scoping phase	Principal phase	TOTALS
Public sector: interviews	4	10	14
Private sector: interviews	1	11	12
Community/voluntary sector: interviews	2	5	7
<b>TOTAL interviews</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>33</b>

**Note:** Wholly owned government organisations (e.g. 'quangos' in the UK and 'semi states' in the Irish Republic) have been counted as public sector.

**Table 4** Interviews by case study area and by sector

Case study	Community/voluntary sector	Private sector	Private sector	Totals
Belfast	3	5	3	11
Cardiff	2	3	2	7
Dublin	1	2	6	9
Liverpool	1	2	3	6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>33</b>

**Note:** (i) Wholly owned government organisations (e.g. 'quangos' in the UK and 'semi states' in the Irish Republic) have been counted as public rather than private sector.  
(ii) Local councillors have been counted as public sector.

### 3.3 The research process

#### The scoping phase

The scoping phase consisted of obtaining ethical approval for the project, a literature review, site visits to each case study area, seven interviews across three of the case study areas (Table 1), and the appointment of an advisory group. A number of conference and seminar presentations were also given, and material from the Belfast case study was used in a publication (Muir, 2013). Approval for the project was gained from the School Research Ethics Committee in the School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering, Queen's University Belfast, in October 2011. The project was carried out according to the University's policies on research governance and ethics and according to the key social research ethical principles of informed consent, confidentiality, anonymity when requested and the avoidance of harm to research participants or staff carrying out the research (Israel and Hay, 2006). In both research phases, two options were provided for informed consent: the naming of the participant's job title and organisation, or no identifying features at all. This proved to be a sensible decision as a number of participants (in both phases of the research) did request the completely anonymised option.

The intention of the scoping phase was to explore the political economy of waterfront development, including the impact of the financial crisis, and also to acquaint ourselves with the case study sites including the possibility of new interview contacts, and through interviews to explore the accuracy of the waterfront development narratives presented to us in the literature. Interviews were completed by March 2012. A project advisory group was recruited towards the end of the scoping phase, consisting of:

- **Dr Andrew Grounds**, Queen's University Belfast
- **Dr John McCarthy**, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh
- **Dr Niamh Moore**, University College Dublin
- **Professor Bill Neill**, University of Aberdeen
- **Dr Huw Thomas**, University of Cardiff

The scoping phase identified six key themes: the importance of public subsidy; community attitudes to the developments being rather more mixed than we had imagined, with some very positive comments; the role of the built environment in creating either cohesion

or segregation; heritage; connectivity of various kinds including 'of the mind' (see Chapter Four); and housing issues including affordability, access to social housing and gentrification causing changes to the character of the area. The findings assisted with the design of the principal phase semi-structured interview schedule, the general direction of the principal phase, and the construction of the framework for analysis. Conference and seminar presentations relating to the scoping phase findings were given as follows:

- **12th September 2012:** 'Challenges for waterfront development: examples from Belfast and Dublin', to Port Adelaide Steering Group, Adelaide, South Australia. Presented by Dr Muir. Other presenters were Dr Susan Oakley (University of Adelaide) and Dr Sue Brownill (Oxford Brookes University)
- **26th September 2012:** '*The 'competitive waterfront' in the neoliberal city*', seminar given by Dr Muir at the City Futures Institute, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
- **23rd November 2012:** 'Neoliberalism and the waterfront: urban transformation and the competitive city', Regional Studies Association Winter Conference, London: 'Smart, Creative, Sustainable, Inclusive: Territorial Development Strategies in the Age of Austerity'. Presented by Dr Boland and Dr Muir.
- **12th April 2013:** Association of American Geographers' Annual Meeting, Los Angeles: *Neoliberalisation and the waterfront: urban transformation and the competitive city*. Presented by Dr Muir and Dr Boland.
- **16th July 2013:** AESOP – ACSP Conference, Dublin: *The "Competitive Waterfront" in the neoliberal city: Who benefits?* Presented by Dr Muir and Dr Boland. Additional material from John Brontë. This presentation was part of a special session on waterfront development chaired by Dick Gleeson, Chief Planner for Dublin City Council, organised by Dr Muir along with Dr Susan Oakley (University of Adelaide), Dr Sue Brownill (Oxford Brookes University) and Dr Niamh Moore (University College Dublin).

The presentations assisted with the assessment of scoping phase findings, the development of the analytical framework, and the expansion of the initial literature review, through exchanges of ideas amongst a wider network of researchers. Further details of these presentations are available from Dr Muir if they cannot be found online.

## The principal phase

The principal phase of the research consisted of 26 semi-structured interviews across the four case studies (Table 3), further site visits and document review, development of the 'competitive waterfront' framework for analysis, analysis of principal phase interviews using NVivo software, writing of the draft research report, circulation to the project advisory group for comments, and production of the final report.

Interviews took place during the second half of 2013. The interview schedule sought to provide a mix of targeted questions by sector and general questions applicable to all. Being semi-structured, at time researchers chose to explore some topics in greater depth to make best use of the expertise of participants. Most interviews were recorded and transcribed, a few were summarised from notes. All were analysed according to the NVivo nodes set out in Appendix Three. Respondents were given a unique identifier according to their sector and case study, using the abbreviations: community/voluntary sector: CVS; private sector: PRI; and public sector: PUB. The data was then used to test the validity of the deductive framework for analysis and also used to assess the research questions.

Due to resource constraints it was not possible to carry out the number of interviews originally intended and they are not spread evenly between case studies. However, the 26 interviews provide data to answer the research questions adequately and to signpost areas of further research. There was some concern during the scoping phase that private sector respondents might be hard to access, however that proved not to be the case. The smaller number of community and voluntary sector participants was deliberate given the focus of the research on private investment and, subsequently, on public subsidy. Principles of ethical research were followed throughout and no ethical issues arose, perhaps because the framework for informed consent and confidentiality/anonymity was clear.

Following the formal conclusion of the project to the satisfaction of the funders, findings will be disseminated more widely through conference papers and journal articles. Opportunities already exist for further research collaborations, including internationally. It is also pleasing to note that one of the research team has begun a PhD in a related subject, which will allow some of the research issues to be explored in greater depth. The project has proved to be beneficial in setting out a baseline for further work on the analysis of 21st century waterfront regeneration in the context of neoliberal urbanism.



## 4.0 Research findings



This chapter reviews the project's research findings. It is in three parts. First, the case study narratives are explored, including the reasons for the waterfront's regeneration, the importance of waterfront development for the city, the impact of the economic downturn and views on the future of the city's waterfront. Second, components of the 'competitive waterfront' analytical framework (Table 1) from the four case studies are assessed. Third, attitudes towards public benefit are reported, structured around the four questions generated from the literature and scoping phase of the research. Following the material presented in this chapter, Chapter Five will provide an overall assessment of the 'competitive waterfront' model and the question 'who benefits' in the case study areas, before drawing more general conclusions and making recommendations for practice.

### 4.1 Part One: Case study narratives

Case study narratives are reviewed in four parts: the reasons for waterfront development; the importance of waterfront development for the city; the impact of the economic downturn; and the future of the city's waterfront.

#### Reasons for waterfront development in the case study cities

Four interconnected reasons for waterfront development were identified. First, there was land availability with development potential, due to changing use. Second, the types of new potential land uses offered were attractive.

Two further less important reasons were: a response to funding opportunities; and political imperatives.

The most straightforward reason for waterfront development was that vacant land with development potential was available due to changing land use: 'well the first reason was that it was there' (CVS1, Dublin). The most common change in land use was that port functions such as unloading of goods and ferry berthing had moved elsewhere, usually not too far away; warehousing was also no longer needed to any great extent: 'the port industry has changed and been reconfigured so it's not what it used to be' (PRIV2, Cardiff). Land also became available due to a decline in industrial use such as steel mills (Cardiff) and shipbuilding (Belfast): 'there was land-take there which required development. Nothing more complicated than that' (PRIV7, Belfast). Port functions remained in all four case studies, however.

Perhaps more significant was the attractive location of vacant land. It was clear that both public and private participants in waterfront development regarded these areas as close enough to the city centre for profitable investment:

*... well all this area down here was brownfield land and it had formerly been in port related uses and that had been in decline since the 70s so there was a lot of vacant land, old warehousing, contaminated land and it's practically city centre so there was a huge need for it to be regenerated (PUB4, Dublin).*

This perception is interesting, given that later in the chapter we examine whether waterfronts are perceived more widely as being accessible from the city centre. Also, large areas of land were available. This opened up possibilities for new signature buildings such as museums, art galleries, concert halls and sports facilities; if contamination could be dealt with then residential development was a possibility. These uses could complement city centre activities where space was more constrained. Finally, the presence of a waterfront area was in itself attractive for development, both in its own right and due to the connection with the city's maritime history: a heritage which had also left historic buildings ripe for refurbishment, especially in Liverpool.

Public sector funding opportunities had been important in the early years of the developments, following the UK's Urban Development Corporation (UDC) model in all four cases. UDCs were quasi-governmental agencies with powers of land assembly, strategic and spatial planning in their designated areas. As explained in Chapter One, the three UK case studies had their roots in UDCs. Much of their work involved making publicly owned land fit for private development in the entrepreneurial climate of the time (Imrie and Thomas, 1999). UDCs worked in partnership with other agencies both public and private, and were able to attract other funding such as European Union (EU) structural funds:

*We moved into the [Laganside] Development Corporation in 1989 and at that time it was the worst ever property market recession in Europe, so you can imagine how difficult it was for Belfast to attract investment. We had the troubles going on and coupled with that there was absolutely no interest in investment. We had access to European funding and we took the decision to maximise and secure as much funding as we could and to put it into infrastructure ... so the significance of this infrastructure led strategy was that people saw tangible changes happening along the river (PRIV4, Belfast).*

The model was also influential in Dublin, where both the Custom House Docks Development Authority (CHDDA) and the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA) had a similar remit to UDCs, including receipt of land transfers and planning powers (Moore, 2008), and also benefitted from EU funding. Although the structures used to manage development in the case studies have changed since the mid 1990s (see Appendix One), public funding opportunities continue to be an important development driver, as explored later in the chapter.

Lastly, political imperatives were of importance, most particularly in Dublin where the origins of the Docklands redevelopment were more directly political than in the UK case studies. In 1982, a commitment to redevelop the land which eventually formed the Custom House Docks redevelopment area was part of a coalition agreement to keep the Taoiseach Charles Haughey in power with the support of an independent Dublin TD, Tony Gregory (Moore, 2008). Although initial work was delayed until the formation of the CHDDA, the 'Gregory deal' helped

to put the needs of local people on the agenda, although arguably they did not come to the fore again until after the establishment of the DDDA in 1997.

In Liverpool and Cardiff, the political imperative was connected with the divided politics of the 1980s, with Conservative-controlled central government setting up unelected bodies such as UDCs to bypass local government in the big cities, which were largely Labour controlled. But the local responses were different in each case. In Liverpool, local MPs of all parties backed the establishment of the MDC; of the three local authorities which covered its area, Liverpool City Council was hostile especially from 1983 – 1989 when a radical left administration refused to take up its seat on the Board. Relations improved in later years (Meegan, 1999). In Cardiff, the county council and the city council worked closely with CBDC and the city council was allowed to retain some planning powers (Punter, 2006).

Belfast presented a different case again. The background of the Northern Ireland troubles gave an additional sense of urgency to the imperative to encourage regeneration and investment, in order to 'normalise the city and create a positive sense of place imagery to international investors and tourists' (Sterrett et al, 2005: 380). One particular Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Richard Needham, was instrumental in championing the regeneration of Belfast from 1978 onwards, including the founding of Laganside (Neill et al, 2014b). Elected politicians at local level appear to have had little to do with supporting the initiatives and at the time there was no regional level government.

### The importance of waterfront development for the city

The importance of development is a slightly different question from the reasons why it happened, and begins to shed some light on who might benefit. Three reasons were identified: waterfronts as important sites for the attraction of investment and hence jobs; the amenity value of the waterfront; and the use of waterfronts to present a modern city identity including an element of social benefit. A problematic aspect of development was also identified here. Although waterfronts were seen as an important aspect of city competitiveness, in some case studies there was also internal competition for investment between different parts of the city and there was concern that investment success on the waterfront was at the expense of other areas.

The attraction of investment leading to jobs was of primary importance in all sectors:

*I suppose had we not done it we would not have been able to attract a lot of the investment that we have seen in the city in the last twenty odd years since the waterfront was first conceived.... it has been a huge job creator in terms of what we've been able to do on the sites adjacent to the water but it's also made the city a much more attractive place both to live and to work and for people to invest in (PUB1, Belfast).*



Image source: Philip Bird LRPS CPAGB /Shutterstock.com

The rhetoric of competitiveness was also in evidence, as will be explored further in Part Two: ‘we are all competing for wealth, jobs, tourism and investment’ (PUB2, Liverpool).

The amenity value of the waterfront was valued, and had been rediscovered in recent years:

*... they used to be dirty old pieces of water but now the amenity potential of the water cannot be underestimated... I started working there in 2003 and all along the north side of the water were warehouses and you couldn't walk along there but now that has been all landscaped and there are benches, walkways, cycle paths and nice lighting so it is a very pleasant place to be ... (PUB3, Dublin).*

The strategic importance of waterfront development in Liverpool was linked to a number of factors: the ambience of living, working and leisure activities near water; the beautiful and historic buildings which are popular for both offices and apartments; and the renewed connectivity to the city via the shopping centre Liverpool One, which made it more accessible (PUB1, Liverpool). In Belfast, the importance of waterfront amenities for tourism was emphasised (CVS3, Belfast).

The role of waterfronts in city marketing and identity was also important in all the case studies (see also Part Two of this chapter). Waterfront development provided an opportunity to present a city as modern, forward-looking and cosmopolitan, which could include an element of social benefit but which was aimed primarily at investors, tourists and ‘creative class’ future residents:

*... it certainly has allowed us to present Belfast as a modern, growing city which has got significant potential for the future. So to be able to talk about the Science Park and they do some phenomenal stuff down there; you've got Game of Thrones one of the biggest blockbusting shows in the USA being filmed there; you've got Titanic signature building world class, really iconic building with real brand value; Waterfront hall that only last week was awarded best city convention location in the UK. So having those assets and being able to tell very positive stories about them allows us to present Belfast in a very positive light when historically people have been used to a very different image (PUB1, Belfast).*

In Liverpool it was said that the city defines itself through the river and the waterfront (CVS1) and that the waterfront was important to ‘give Liverpool a new purpose – past, location, purpose and future’ (PUB1, Liverpool).

Finally, there was a concern that waterfront development had been or could be in the future at the expense of other parts of the city, with the exception of Liverpool where waterfront development was integrated strategically into the regeneration of the whole City (Liverpool Vision, 2013). This concern was most acute in Belfast.

## The future of the city's waterfront

There was a general opinion in all four cases that the waterfront developments were not complete and that it was important to take the long view:

*... regeneration never stops. It will have a function with the south side of the basin that was sold to the WDA which was the Welsh Assembly and now Igloo so there is development that is continuation on the south side of the basin and that is going to take a period of years (PRIV2, Cardiff).*

*I think if it doesn't continue and I know there has been a financial crisis but it sends out signals about the future of the city if you don't; any city has to keep on reinventing itself it seems to me (CVS2, Belfast).*

There was awareness of much unrealised potential, especially in Dublin and Liverpool where demand had begun to return, for example:

*... one of the great eyesores of the docklands was the Anglo Irish building – HQ of Anglo Irish Bank, it was right on the river on the North Quays and it was 15/16 storey and all you saw were the open floors and it was there for years and now the Central Bank has taken that and is completing the build on it and is going to move from the city centre (PUB6, Dublin; see also Figure 1).*

In Liverpool, it is arguable that regeneration did not really slow down at all. Peel Holdings have a 20-year development plan as part of the Mersey Waters Enterprise Zone (PRIV2, Liverpool) and a Business Improvement District has been introduced (PRIV1, Liverpool). An unusual perspective from Liverpool was that the city should become less dependent on waterfront activities, particularly tourism, and should pay more attention to developing a more diverse economy (PUB2, Liverpool). There was concern that it might be difficult to obtain public funding in future to underpin development. New ideas or models for the future consisted of an opportunistic approach to development as evidenced above. In Dublin there had been a recent major structural change with the impending abolition of the DDDA and reversion of its responsibilities to Dublin City Council including a SDZ for part but not all of the Docklands area. This will retain a simplified planning system for the SDZ only:

*... I see it as a positive, but I'm concerned because I want Dublin City Council to treat it with the utmost importance because it will shape what happens next and if it's too prescriptive, too difficult for developers to be able to work within its parameters it might force people to locate elsewhere ... We've had bad experience with SDZs in Ireland to date ... (PRIV1, Dublin).*

**Figure 1**

**Unfinished Anglo Irish Bank HQ, Dublin, 2011**



Image source: Jenny Muir

## 4.2 Part Two: Applying the 'competitive waterfront' analytical framework

This section assesses whether components of the 'competitive waterfront' analytical framework (Table 2, Chapter Two) were found in the case study developments, including aspects of: the ideological framework for development; governance; use of space (land and water); and connectivity.

### Analytical category 1: ideological framework

There was no question that the primary purpose of all the waterfront areas was to attract private sector investment, to create jobs and to add value: 'we are all competing for wealth, jobs, tourism and investment' (PUB2, Liverpool). There was a strong discourse about competitiveness and city marketing, with the phrase 'open for business' used several times and a focus on the waterfront as a marketable brand. However, there was an underlying acknowledgement of the importance of public sector financial and strategic support in order to be able to make this happen, resulting in a 'soft neoliberal' approach rather than a sense that the market on its own would be able to achieve regeneration objectives. It was considered important to promote the waterfront and the wider city environment as attractive for investment and tourism, which implied the need for workable public infrastructure such as reliable transport, health, education and policing provision. Specific marketing factors connected to the waterfront include maritime history and historic buildings, modern signature buildings, and quality of life connected with proximity to the water.

Following the financial crisis, there was some caution about the extent of genuinely market-led development even though demand was beginning to pick up. The role of development bodies and government agencies were regarded as crucial and there was still a need for public sector pump priming of investment even though all the developments had been in existence in some shape or form since the 1980s:

*So what we try to do is an exemplar first phase that we probably make a loss on and you hold onto that investment for at least a decade, the area regenerates around it and the values go up and the key to regeneration is capturing that increase in value (PRIV1, Cardiff).*

*I suppose the question is what can DCC continue to do to incentivise and push for development within the area, but very much allowing the market in some respects to dictate what happens next and what uses are delivered (PUB6, Dublin).*

However, a Liverpool investor was optimistic about a new link to bring Chinese capital into the area to develop an International Trade Centre: 'we are going to the world to get money, investment and partners, there's not money here at the moment' and 'everyone likes Liverpool' (PRIV2, Liverpool). The recent increase in prominent IT companies such as Google and Facebook in Dublin is another example, and there was a view in Belfast that lower corporation tax in Dublin made it hard for Laganside and Titanic Quarter to compete.

Therefore, although it could still be said that the balance was in favour of private sector development, it was important that development agencies (whether public or private) and public bodies were able to facilitate private development so that there was confidence of a return on investment. Examples of this dynamic were mentioned in relation to the UDC eras in Cardiff and Belfast, and in the present day in Liverpool, where concern was expressed that too much control had been given to the private sector and to Peel Holdings in particular (PUB1, Liverpool, see also Harrison, 2014). But it was also noted that the public sector does not have the resources to redevelop the waterfront further without market driven private involvement (PUB3, Liverpool).

Marketing the waterfront was seen as of the utmost importance in all four areas:

*... we have said it is something new and positive and forward looking and open for business and that is the message that we are putting out more particularly to the world out there that we hope will invest in it (PRIV2, Belfast; see also Figure 2).*

*... it conveys I think quite a glamorous, forward looking, and culturally aware image now (PRIV3, Cardiff).*

It was seen as important to market the waterfront as part of a wider city competitiveness offer rather than on its own:

*... in my view it [Cardiff] needs to be marketed as a city region, so promote what is within the city region and the waterfront is a big ... to go down the bay is a big promotional thing now whereas 20/30 years ago it was the opposite (PRIV2, Cardiff).*

We found some reservations about this process in Dublin:

*They are selling a brand new shiny place so you wouldn't expect them to point to rundown social housing or areas of serious unemployment ... but it is part of our lived experience and it's the attempt to deal with those issues that made us so strong on the social and economic regeneration idea ... look we have Google here and O2 yet we have abject poverty right around the corner here and they are never going to be referring to that (CVS1, Dublin).*

In this light, it was interesting to hear what people regarded as unique about the waterfront. It tended to be the heritage aspects although in some cases proximity to the city centre, up to date office facilities and modern signature buildings were also mentioned.

Figure 2

Titanic Belfast marketed as part of Northern Ireland-wide 'Our Time Our Place' tourism promotion, 2012



Image source: Jenny Muir

## Analytical category 2: governance

In all cases, governance was based on public/private partnerships, although the balance of the two sectors varied between case studies and had also varied over time. Public subsidy was of the utmost importance for facilitating private investment. The private sector was involved in decision-making, sometimes directly as in the case of Belfast where the development agency was a private body, and in other cases indirectly through membership of partnership bodies (such as Liverpool Vision) or through informal contacts. Community involvement in governance – as opposed to community consultation – was extremely limited with the exception of Dublin, where it was built into the legislation that had created the DDDA. We did not find evidence of any significant counter-hegemonic community activity in our case study areas, such as organised campaigning against land use and the presentation of alternative approaches, although in the past there had been protests about aspects of several of the developments. Finally, the creation of strategic planning frameworks was seen as a key state contribution to waterfront regeneration. For the lifetime of these developments, streamlined planning policy had been important for the facilitation of private investment and this looked likely to continue, for example in Dublin's new SDZ. However, planning policy was not completely laissez-faire, as seen in Liverpool in the Peel Holdings application, which took a long time to process and which was challenged by UNESCO.

Public subsidy was crucial to the relationship between public and private sectors in all four case studies. A Liverpool developer admitted 'we go for any subsidies we can get' (PRIV2, Liverpool), and in Belfast:

*... a lot of what has happened on that site, in fact the vast majority of it, has been as a result of public sector funds – the Paint Hall was funded by the public sector, the college is a public sector project, Titanic Quarter for the most part, well there is private sector money in it, but the vast majority of the money in that building [Titanic Belfast] is public sector money ... the Science Park is public sector money. So without that public sector investment there would not have been the development to the extent there has been. OK there are other developments there such as the Citibank HQ building and such like but for the most part the development has been reliant on the public sector and I suppose to some extent the public sector again saw their role as almost a catalyst for the broader development of that area (PUB1, Belfast).*

Other important elements of public sector involvement included land ownership or assembly, and strategic planning. On the other hand, the private sector was seen to contribute not only private finance but also different capabilities and attitude to risk. Cardiff provided an example of how partnerships had worked during the UDC period:

*ABP [Associated British Ports] focused on the Inner Harbour and used a vehicle called Grosvenor Waterside Cardiff Bay plc. which was a subsidiary of Grosvenor Waterside Group which was a subsidiary of ABP and that worked with the Development Corporation. There was a legal development agreement in place and clear rules set down as to who did what. So CBDC built some infrastructure, ABP built some and there were some JV [joint venture] works and basically ABP had a planning brief agreed so they knew they could build 600 sq foot of offices, so the whole thing was based on goodwill and cooperation. And against that backdrop you had the political will of the Welsh Office that was putting in funds to build the Barrage (PRIV3, Cardiff).*

A more recent example in Belfast's Titanic Quarter shows how network governance operates today. The development agency is a private company, TQ Ltd., a subsidiary of Harcourt Developments. The freehold of the land is owned by a Trust Port arms-length agency, the Belfast Harbour Commission. The signature building Titanic Belfast is owned by a registered charity, the Titanic Foundation, and operated by TQ Ltd (Magee, 2012). Other key partners include Belfast City Council, which contributed funds to Titanic Belfast, and other government departments which have contributed funding plus planning and other policy and regulation. Politicians at local and regional level have also been supportive. Public-private partnerships have been used to construct the public records office, the new college, and Titanic Belfast.

However, working with the private sector has not been without its problems. The award of the Titanic Belfast building contract to Harcourt Construction (NI) Ltd, an associated company, by TQ Ltd raised questions about lack of competition from the European Union in relation to public procurement rules (Ramsey, 2013). Also relating to Titanic Belfast, the drawing up of a Memorandum of Understanding between TQ Ltd and BCC failed to deliver promised local jobs (Muir, 2013). Cardiff Bay saw delays in several crucial projects such as the Barrage, the Wales Millennium Centre and the Senedd, although they may have been due more to a complex governance structure than to the involvement of the private sector *per se*. The appropriateness of the powerful wider role of Peel Holdings in the governance of the North West of England has been questioned (Harrison, 2014). And most seriously, in Dublin, conflict of interest on the DDDA Board over the Irish Glass Bottle site led to the abolition of the Authority (C&AG, 2012, Moore-Cherry, 2013).

Community involvement in governance was minimal, with the exception of Dublin. Effective exclusion from the CHDDA operations had resulted in 'a politicization and mobilization of the local community on a scale unseen in many other areas' (Moore, 2008: 179), therefore the Dublin Docklands Development Authority Act 1997 established not only a small appointed Board but also a Docklands Council with wider membership

including community representatives, trade unionists, local politicians, the Chamber of Commerce and state agencies. The Council was still somewhat constrained in its operations, because its members were government appointees and the role of the Council was advisory. A Community Liaison Committee also provided opportunities for wider local input (Moore, 2008):

*There was a two year run in of consultation on the Masterplan where a lot of people had a say in it ... The legislation was designed in a way that part of the development's profits had to go into social regeneration as well as economic regeneration (PUB5, Dublin).*

The community view was more sceptical and pragmatic:

*... we took the view that no matter what way we approached it there was going to be people making millions down there and our role and our function was to try to get our fair share of that millions in terms of spend on social and economic regeneration. So we were looking for as a big a slice of the cake as we could get and we recognised that whether we liked it or not a cake was going to be baked (CVS1, Dublin).*

The dynamics of the Docklands Council are described here:

*The idea was that the [Docklands] Council was there to reflect stakeholder interests and to try to ensure that as far as possible that information was being fed back out into the various organisations and that particular views and concerns could be shared. ... I suppose the community would always be pushing the Authority to find out what's the social dividend of a lot of the investments and activities. And the other side would have been the political where you would have local councillors from Dublin City Council who might be reflecting particular political views so you would have a political dimension there (PUB6, Dublin).*

Although Dublin provided the only example of long-term structured involvement, there were other instances of community impact on governance through consultation, for example on planning applications or on more extensive documents such as Masterplans. The degree of community involvement did not seem to affect public opinion about the developments, which we found in the scoping phase of this research to be mixed, with some appreciation of the more superficial benefits discussed later in the chapter.

In Belfast and the early days of the MDC in Liverpool, there was a real issue about the lack of residents in the redevelopment area and therefore about who was to be consulted. In Cardiff, the long-standing residential community of Butetown felt alienated from the regeneration in the early days (as found in this research's scoping phase) and now appears to be developing their area through a separate publicly funded regeneration programme including new social housing. There was also wider opposition in Cardiff to the Barrage, on environmental grounds (Cowell and Thomas, 2002). In Liverpool and Cardiff, residents'

associations formed in new apartment blocks and opposed other new development: in Liverpool, they objected to the scale of the Peel Holdings planning application but also the possible introduction of social housing in the area (CVS1, Liverpool); and in Cardiff, again further development was initially opposed:

*And now I've been back to them three times with the residential phase which is immediately opposite where they live and now I can genuinely say we have got a really positive dialogue with them and they've really bought into this and I've got a number registered and interested in moving there, but that has taken about 5 years to build up trust with them (PRIV1, Cardiff).*

None of these activities can be described as counter-hegemonic. We did not find any sustained community opposition to waterfront development, nor any kind of alternative regeneration vision being put forward.

Finally, the role of planning policy in the governance of the developments was a crucial element of the role of the state and also of the working relationship between public and private sectors:

*Now you had the usual sparring ... but by and large there was an acceptance and a willingness from all the parties involved to go for the common objective which was to get the development done. So I wouldn't be critical of the planning authorities because they had a role there (PRIV2, Cardiff).*

There was an overall aspiration for quick and simple planning procedures, although these are not always realised, for example Phase 1 of Titanic Quarter and the very large Peel Holdings application in Liverpool. In Dublin, the new SDZ designation will maintain fast-track planning for part of the Docklands site. Many of the larger buildings or developments included public money, which changed the planning dynamic: 'when public money is involved and it has to be spent by a certain date it certainly speeds up the planning process' (PRIV5, Belfast). Funding from other sources also provided opportunities to ensure developers operated in the public interest:

*... what we are doing with the [Harland & Wolff] Drawing Offices at present we have applied for Heritage Lottery funding we want to have the maximum preservation of the building... because they'll stipulate it and it agrees with what we want to do (CVS3, Belfast).*

Strategic planning was seen as a crucial aspect of state involvement in regeneration; the importance of providing guidance on the kind of development that would be acceptable, and framing it into a coherent whole, was particularly emphasised in Liverpool.




Image source: Dafinka / Shutterstock.com

## Analytical category 3: use of space

Use of space is of course at the heart of waterfront development, shaped by ideology and governance as described in Chapter Two. The 'competitive waterfront' model underestimated the emotional appeal of water as part of the design and use of waterfront areas. Unsurprisingly, all the case studies had followed a mixed use development model, which had sometimes progressed more slowly than anticipated due to the economic downturn but which had also ensured survival due to ability to adjust phasing and to respond to unforeseen opportunities. Therefore function had converged with the rest of the city. However, form had not: the availability of large parcels of land had provided opportunities for modern offices and signature buildings, and large scale public events, as well as building conservation and leisure use based around maritime heritage. Housing was generally in the form of high value apartments, with any social or affordable housing provided through public sector agreement with developers, sometimes due to community pressure. There was a lack of focus on environmental features such as flood management, but conservation of historic buildings was important as part of maritime heritage, especially in Liverpool. Public access to waterfront areas was not constrained in terms of public space, but there were restrictions due to admission charges for amenities; this was to some extent balanced by free events, usually with public subsidy, and all four developments included public art.

The attraction of the land and water interface was mentioned earlier in the chapter, however it is striking how the appeal of water in the urban context was identified and the quite lyrical way in which that appeal was described, a factor we had underestimated. The most obvious example of this was in Cardiff, where the Barrage, albeit controversial, had created a new lake which was arguably the defining characteristic of the development. In other cases the cities had rediscovered their river frontage in a very positive way (Figure 3):

*If you think about it cities are almost by definition are densely populated, developed areas with limited open spaces and so water gives some sort of relief which I don't know what is deep in our psyche but we seem to respond positively to it. If you go up there and look over that water mass in Abercorn Basin it immediately impacts positively you feel good but I can't go beyond that. People do relate to it and they don't have to positively assess it they just instinctively, intuitively relate to it (PRIV2, Belfast).*

*I think there is something fundamental in being near water, seeing water, it's a spiritual kind of thing, it's hard to define (CVS1, Dublin).*

**Figure 3**

**The appeal of water – Grand Canal Dock, Dublin**



Image source: Jenny Muir

All the case study areas had followed a mixed use approach to development and that had allowed them to manage the slower pace over the past few years, due to ability to adjust phasing, access public subsidy and take up unforeseen opportunities:

*... if you've got good design, good planning and you put all those things into the mix I think all these things become self-reinforcing and I don't think you can have one element without the others and I don't think one takes priority. I think they are all pieces of the jigsaw and without all those pieces you don't have a product (PUB1, Belfast).*

Therefore function had converged with the rest of the city; however, form had not, due to land availability. Despite the availability of public subsidy, the developments were still driven by economic development and job creation, which included education facilities. In Belfast, the opening of the new Belfast Metropolitan College campus had brought a new population into the area, increasing demand for public transport and convenience shopping, as well as providing a well designed new building. In all cases, there was still a focus on office development as an economic development driver, along with tourism and leisure activities (see Appendix One for details of the case study projects). All four cities had examples of the use of spectacle on their waterfront: Titanic Belfast and

public events on the Titanic Slipways; Cardiff's Senedd and Wales Millennium Centre; Dublin's Grand Canal Dock including the Bord Gais Energy Theatre (Figure 4), new bridges, the Convention Centre and O2 Arena; and the Museum of Liverpool, and Echo Arena and Convention Centre. Many of these buildings were designed by prestigious architects and the projects included public art:

*... suddenly the fledgling National Assembly for Wales needed somewhere to base itself... our interest in that was that that would create a significant anchor in Cardiff Bay ... from our point of view it was a way of securing some really good quality investment as the debating chamber was designed by the Richard Rogers Partnership (PRIV3, Cardiff).*

Another focus was leisure provision, linked to signature buildings and the marketing of the areas for access to museums, the arts, public space and to a lesser extent sports facilities. Museums could be new signature buildings (Belfast and Liverpool) or older renovated examples such as the Merseyside Maritime Museum (Figure 5) and the International Slavery Museum in Albert Dock, Liverpool. The critical mass of museums in Liverpool (also including the Beatles Story), along with the Tate Liverpool art gallery, provided a successful focus for tourism which also included the historic Three Graces, public walkways and hotels.

**Figure 4**

**Bord Gais Energy Theatre, Grand Canal Dock, Dublin**



Image source: Jenny Muir

**Figure 5** Liverpool Maritime Museum, Albert Dock



Image source: Jenny Muir

The responsibility of ‘selling history’ was identified in our scoping phase. In Liverpool, the city’s history is presented comprehensively and with acknowledgement of issues such as the slave trade. In Belfast there is a feeling that the history of sectarianism of the city’s shipyards has been sanitised (Neill, 2011) and bypassed through a focus on one ship, the Titanic, rather than on the totality of the area’s history. In Dublin, the most striking elements of leisure use relate to performance art, in the O2 Arena and the Bord Gais Energy Theatre; and restaurants, hotels and public space. Cardiff has focused on performance art in the Wales Millennium Centre and otherwise on entertainment and restaurants in, for example, the Atlantic Wharf Leisure Village, Mermaid Quay and the Red Dragon Centre, as well as the Dr Who Experience and the Cardiff Bay Wetlands Reserve. All four areas either have existing or planned facilities for cruise liners to dock.

Of the different leisure activities, retail provision has been the least successful, with the exception of Cardiff which is the furthest of our case studies from its city centre. In Belfast, there is very little retail in Laganside and TQ, on the basis that the main retail core remains in the city centre including the new Victoria Square shopping centre. In Dublin, the small chq development near the IFSC has had more success with coffee shops, cafés and restaurants than with a broader retail offer, despite being a good 10 – 15 minute walk from major retail centres in Grafton Street or Henry Street. The opinion, though, was that ‘it’s too close to the retail core which is established and overshopped arguably already’ (PRIV2, Dublin). However, the Point Village, adjacent to the O2 Arena, is further away and will include a shopping centre.

In Liverpool, there is no major retail centre on the waterfront itself as Liverpool One is close by; small tourist-oriented shops are a feature of the Albert Dock.

Housing has been another area with mixed results due to the economic situation. Most housing in all four developments are high value apartments for sale on the private market and providing an important source of cash flow for developers (the question of social housing will be considered in Part Three). This model was damaged during the economic crisis, particularly in Dublin and Belfast where house prices plummeted. As described in Appendix Three, the TQ apartments (Fig. 10) suffered a fall in value between off plan sales and completion, leading some purchasers to have difficulty obtaining mortgages (Muir, 2013). Developers in these cities remain cautious about building more apartments, however in Liverpool and Cardiff new development is proceeding and the market seems particularly healthy in Liverpool. The overall situation with residential property over the past few years shows the strength of the mixed use model.

It is striking that, with the exception of the Cardiff Bay Barrage, we did not find any high profile emphasis on the natural environment in our case studies. Building conservation was important as part of maritime heritage, especially in Liverpool with its World Heritage Site status and large number of still derelict warehouses. In Belfast, Dublin and Cardiff, more demolition had taken place and, in Belfast, the old Harland & Wolff Drawing Office in which the Titanic was designed remained derelict next to Titanic Belfast (Neill, 2011). It is now to be refurbished with National Lottery money as part of a hotel conversion.

A Cardiff developer refuted the idea that developers would not engage with building conservation:

*Sadly a lot of public bodies think developers want sites completely flattened with a red line around whereas very often we plead with people don't touch it we would rather you just left it because there were a number of industrial buildings here, that were of no architectural value but we could have made them safe and watertight and put meanwhile uses in them ... we have tried to retain as much of the past as we can (PRIV1, Cardiff).*

The next two criteria in the 'competitive waterfront' model in relation to land use (public access and public benefit; see Figure 6) will be covered in more detail in Part Three, as they relate to public benefit to be gained from the developments. But in this section it is important to note that in our case study developments there was very little constraining of public access, for example to the waterfront in the form of public walkways. Public art, events and high quality public realm design created a pleasant environment:

*... there is a lot of public things like the maritime festival and there are a lot of events so yeah I would use it and if I want to go for a night out I might go to the O2 or the Bord Gais theatre or on a nice evening just go for an amble along there it's beautiful (CVS1, Dublin).*

Restricted access to amenities on grounds of cost was more likely, although the examples of charges below (taken from web sites on 19th October 2014) show that Liverpool is most accessible:

- Titanic Belfast: Adult £15.50; family ticket £39; 5% discount for advance booking
- Dr Who Experience, Cardiff: Adult £21.50 in advance, £25 on door; family ticket £65 in advance, £78 on door
- Bord Gais Energy Theatre ticket range, November 2014: €18 – €55
- The Museum of Liverpool and Tate Liverpool permanent exhibitions are free and the Beatles Story costs £12.95 adults and £7.00 children.

In Belfast, Laganside and particularly TQ were quietly promoted as accessible for both Protestant and Catholic communities in this still divided city, despite the historic connection of the shipyards with Protestant East Belfast:

*There's no point hiding from it, I supposed Titanic Quarter is seen as a relatively 'neither one side or the other' sort of location – it's a neutral location. All of the events, concerts down there push it as a neutral location (PRIV7, Belfast).*

**Figure 6**

**Titanic Quarter apartments**



Image source: Jenny Muir

### Analytical category 4: connectivity

Connectivity is arguably the Achilles Heel of waterfronts. We found connectivity of all kinds to be crucial to the success of waterfront developments, to the extent that we added it to the analytical framework as a separate category after the scoping phase. Five different types of connectivity were identified. Physical connectivity is the most obvious, and was weak in all our case studies except Liverpool, where public transport links were good and there was a pedestrian link from the city centre through the popular Liverpool One shopping centre. There was a general emphasis on pedestrian access and walkability, including walkways and clear signage (PUB2, Liverpool). Connectivity via Liverpool One had helped with the strategic perception of the waterfront as part of the city (PUB3, Liverpool).

This general weakness means that we cannot talk about complete physical integration between waterfronts and the city, even if we can say that functions have converged. A common problem is that transport infrastructure is not provided early in the development, perhaps because it requires public expenditure. Connectivity as part of city marketing is common (covered in analytical category 1). International connectivity through technology was not highlighted, except for mention of high speed broadband in Belfast and Liverpool; it may well be an aspect of commercial development that is taken for granted. Finally, connectivity 'of the mind' is linked to identity and a sense of history, and includes civic or community pride in waterfront developments in situations where individuals do not benefit

materially. More prosaically, it can also involve a feeling that waterfront developments are further away geographically than they actually are, perhaps due to poor physical connectivity or to barriers such as road systems. We found evidence of both. This can impact on use of waterfront amenities, especially by local residents.

Belfast's Laganside was well connected as it was adjacent to the city centre, but links with TQ remained poor: a roads system deterred pedestrians and divided the train station from the development (Coyles, 2013); bus services had improved since the opening of the college but still required improvement. None of this has prevented the area becoming popular with tourists. A new rapid transit bus service was planned, along with a footbridge.

Cardiff Bay was the furthest from the city centre of our four case studies and had had problems with physical connectivity in the past. A new road, Lloyd George Avenue, had been constructed to link the Bay with the city centre and a regional metro system announced in 2014 will begin with the same route. In Dublin, the city's LUAS tram system was not extended to the North side of the Docklands area until 2009 (Figure 7) and the South side connectivity relies on buses. But the most important aspect of improving connectivity in Dublin was the construction of two new bridges, the Sean O' Casey Bridge (pedestrians and cyclists) and the Samuel Beckett Bridge, to connect both sides of the river and to open up access to Grand Canal Dock in particular. Grand Canal Dock is also within walking distance of the City Centre.

Figure 7

Spencer Dock LUAS station, Dublin




Image source: Jenny Muir

Finally, we explored the two aspects of connectivity 'of the mind'. We did find some identification with the area and a wider sense of civic pride in the improvements, especially in Belfast and Dublin:

*I think working class people do visit and take their children to Titanic Belfast and the people of East Belfast do have a kind of psychological link with the shipyards and take their kids etc just to see this is where I worked or your granddad worked (PRIV5, Belfast).*

*I feel that the people who live in the hinterland and in the docklands communities certainly do feel connected because for generations their families got work there so that connection is there and I think a lot of them are quite proud of a lot of the developments (CVS1, Dublin).*

In terms of distance, this seemed to be more of an issue for local people than for tourists:

*... well the first issue is to get over the perception issue and this applies to most redevelopment as there is a perception that the docks aren't a place to go to (PRIV2, Cardiff).*

The overall challenge of linking waterfronts both physically and psychologically was acknowledged:

*It's really linking it back to the city is the real challenge but making it a quarter of its own that has a real identity, mixed use identity but also that links back to the city and feels very much part of the city centre, what we call the traditional city centre because we think it is part of the city centre really (PRIV5, Belfast).*



## 4.3 Part Three: Who benefits from waterfront development?

The final part of this chapter provides examples from the case studies about who benefits from waterfront development, with an emphasis on examining 'public benefit'. The section is structured around the four questions as derived from the literature in Chapter Two:

- 1. Conceptualisation:** What is the understanding of 'public benefit'?
- 2. Type:** How do the public benefit?
- 3. Role:** Who is responsible for the delivery of public benefit?
- 4. Distribution:** Which groups benefit most and least?

'Public benefit' was defined very widely, both in terms of who was included and the type of benefit, which could be either individual or collective. Some stated that waterfront development was intrinsically beneficial because it had replaced dereliction. There were contrasting attitudes towards the idea of 'trickle down' benefits from economic development, but the majority of public and private sector participants thought it was a valid approach. The key finding here is that it is important to understand that definitions of both 'public' and 'benefit' in property-led development can be very different from the more targeted approach used in the regeneration of disadvantaged areas.

The types of benefits provided were generally superficial, for example leisure activities rather than jobs or social housing. However, there were also some examples of more targeted benefits such as social housing, education or jobs. Dublin appeared to do better than others, because social benefit was more embedded in their governance structure (see Part Two). It was clear that the facilitation of public benefit was achieved largely by the public sector, either through funding, legal or negotiated agreements, or political pressure. Subsequent implementation of public benefit could be delivered by any sector.

Finally, the question of which groups benefited most and least was hard to answer definitively without access to more reliable and comprehensive statistics; we found no evidence of public benefit being measured systematically, but we found narratives of exclusion which certainly indicated that the benefits were uneven. Again it was an important finding that in most cases projects were not intended primarily to benefit the local community; rather their proposed impact was city-wide and further afield including tourists and potential investors.

### Question 1: What is the understanding of 'public benefit'?

It is very clear that the primary purpose of waterfront developments is to attract investment, rather than to provide targeted benefits to local people, as shown by the case study mission statements and objectives (Chapter One). Therefore it was not surprising that the idea of 'public benefit' was treated somewhat ambiguously in interviews, and used interchangeably with other terms such as 'public interest', 'public good' and 'community gain'. The benefits of the regeneration were seen as applying to a wide range of people:

*I think we all benefit from having a building and an experience such as they provide [Titanic Belfast]. From family upwards, to those who are coming to visit, and just from a bit of civic pride as well. It's a wonderful building. But there's public benefit in the other buildings as well. You only have to walk through the Metropolitan College to see the standard of facility that is, against what used to be in the city centre here. So there's definitely a public benefit (PRIV7, Belfast).*

A common response was that the regeneration was intrinsically beneficial because it was better than the dereliction which it had replaced:

*... what was there in the 1980s – you know drug use was rife; unemployment was huge in the area. It was literally a no go area, and to see that transformed into the world class centre it is today has just been phenomenal (PRIV1, Dublin).*

*... in those days you needed quite a leap of faith to walk down Bute Street and look at the intertidal mud and the derelict buildings and think yeah we'll put an Opera House here and a new Welsh Assembly here, performing Arts centre and we will have people coming here on a Saturday night paying £50 a head to eat sushi (PRIV3, Cardiff).*

Thus the conversion of a brownfield site into an asset represented a benefit to the general public, increased city competitiveness and was for the overall good of the city. In relation to Belfast, Ramsey (2013: 176) observes: 'TQ is cast as a prime example of how private economic development, with the support of private finance, can supposedly benefit the whole of the economy and, by extension, the people of NI'. It follows, then, that for one participant, 'I would see the benefits more in terms of investment and the trickledown from that' (PRIV7, Belfast). The majority of public and private sector respondents thought this was a valid approach and in some cases this view was strongly supported, but it was unpopular with this community activist working in the more structured environment of Dublin Docklands:

*... the trickle down effect is a lot of nonsense which has been proved for many, many years it is a neoliberal construct that has been shown to be outmoded many times, in my view. If we were depending on trickle down effects we would have had virtually no benefits from the docklands development (CVS1, Dublin).*

## **Question 2: How do the public benefit?**

The most obvious identified benefits were generally superficial and not related to particular groups, for example leisure provision. Here we consider examples of three different types of potential public benefit: economic development (including jobs and education), housing (including social and affordable housing), and leisure, amenities and public realm. Further examples from the case studies are provided in Appendix One.

In Belfast, the creation of new employment opportunities has been a crucial element of both Laganside and TQ. Laganside estimated 14,700 jobs were created by the UDC (Laganside Corporation, 2007). Titanic Quarter's web site suggests that over 4,000 jobs have been created in Titanic Quarter to date. However, it is unclear whether local people have been able to access employment to any significant extent, given the focus on attracting the educated, professional and creative classes. This is especially important given that the waterfront borders some of the most deprived wards of the city (Ramsey, 2013). The Memorandum of Understanding signed between TQ and Belfast City Council with the aim of delivering benefits to local communities from Titanic Belfast, was criticised for its lack of action in regard to local employment (Brontë 2012) and did not deliver the intended outputs in terms of jobs or training (Muir, 2013).

In Dublin, Doucet and Duignan (2012) interviewed Docklands residents to see if they had benefitted from new employment opportunities, in an area where high profile jobs were being offered in areas such as IT and finance but where low-paid service jobs were also available. They found a statistical decrease in local unemployment along with qualitative evidence of residents gaining jobs or knowing of people who had. The researchers identified a great deal of optimism as a result, along with some disappointment, especially with lack of access to jobs in construction. Although most jobs were low paid, one respondent was working in financial services after undertaking a local education course. This highlights the opportunities provided through the new local campus of the National College of Ireland and others:

*If we look at education in Docklands at the time in 1997 less than 2% went to third level education; 55% were dropping out of school before they went into second level. And the drop out within primary level was about 15%. That is huge. I mean education was just a throwaway. But when Docklands [DDDA] came in and put in all of their education practices through the community gain education improved. I think*

*they're at national level now in third level education standards, with kids in the inner city going into third level education. ... But once the economics of it went down that meant all the social aspects went down as well. So within the next generation or so, if we don't do something, it will all just go back to the way it was (PUB5, Dublin).*

Education facilities were also available in Belfast (the Metropolitan College) and Cardiff (a media campus), and in Liverpool a new Community College is planned for Princes Dock (PRIV2, Liverpool). Local labour in construction schemes have been run in Cardiff and Dublin Dockland's Local Labour Charter stipulates that 20% of construction jobs must be filled by local people. Other initiatives in Dublin include Jobs Placement Programme and Local Employment Forum. Therefore the interconnected areas of economic development and education can benefit local people but a more systematic approach is needed to ensure success on a wider scale.

Providing social benefit through housing is particularly difficult for waterfronts because, as discussed in Part Two, high value apartments generate cash flow. Provision of social and affordable housing comes about either through negotiation or regulation. In Belfast there was no existing community to negotiate for social housing in Phase 1 of TQ and there is no 'planning gain' legislation to require developers to contribute a proportion of social housing as a condition of planning permission. Therefore there is to date no social housing included in either Laganside or TQ although over 1175 units have been built. TQ's Phase 2 apartments will include 15% social or affordable housing as a condition of Belfast City Council's Memorandum of Understanding, but there are no plans to continue with residential development on the site until demand improves. By contrast, planning gain legislation in England and Wales has ensured some social housing provision in Cardiff and Liverpool (see Appendix One). In Dublin there was no planning gain legislation in 1997 when the DDDA was formed, but local pressure led to the adoption of a 20% social housing requirement for new developments, which became national policy in 2000 (Moore, 2008).

Finally there are the less targeted but still tangible benefits involving leisure, amenities and the quality of the public realm. Doucet and Deighan (2012) also interviewed local residents in Dublin Docklands about new amenities and the responses were less positive than they had been about jobs, as the new restaurants, bars and single supermarket were regarded as too expensive. However, the wider picture in all the case studies has been an increased benefit from the quality of new facilities and public space. For example, in Belfast the provision of high quality public realm and space for leisure and entertainment were commonly identified as a public benefit, with walkways, squares and public art helping to counter the investment-driven focus of the waterfront.

This was perhaps particularly so in the more established Laganside area. Various (usually free) public events held at the Titanic Slipways aim to the waterfront a central space in Belfast's aspiration to become an inclusive, post-conflict city. Wide accessibility to these benefits is more questionable, given charges for heritage activities and parking, and the poor level of public transport at the present time. However, the growing attraction of TQ was clear to one respondent:

*Things like T13 [sports facility] is fantastic for young people, the Paint Hall there's image things that are good things down there and can actually start to give it a personality. If they do that what you can create is a very dynamic part of the city. You've got the Science Park and you've got T13 that is about youth and leisure and if I was them I would be promoting this whole dynamic image and then you get people who want to be part of that (CVS2, Belfast).*

### Question 3: Who is responsible for the delivery of public benefit?

As has been noted earlier, waterfront regeneration is delivered by partnerships in which public agencies provide the strategic framework and subsidy, the private sector leads on delivery and access to loan finance, and the voluntary or community sector, although often marginalised, is able to deliver some services or lobby for community gains. As illustrated in question 2, the facilitation of public benefit was achieved largely by the public sector and implementation could then be the responsibility of any sector. It is arguable that Belfast's local population has gained the least out of the four case studies, having been dependent on public funds and planning gain for non-housing elements only (such as infrastructure). Other case studies had either a stronger legislative framework or more influential community representation in governance. With the exception of very generalised public benefit such as public realm and public art, Belfast's local benefits have been delivered primarily by non-market agencies. Third sector projects include the GEMs job matching project first established in Laganside, the recent T13 Urban Sports Academy, and Titanic Belfast itself, which is owned by a charitable trust. In future it will be pressure from Belfast City Council, along with planning policy, which will deliver social housing in TQ. Public sector-led projects include the Belfast Metropolitan College and the Public Records Office, although both are replacement sites rather than new provision.

### Question 4: Which groups benefit most and least?

Many different types of groups could benefit from waterfront development, including: the general public, tourists, specialist workforces, potential apartment buyers and other investors, interest groups and the local community. It is important to emphasise yet again that in most cases waterfront development projects were not intended primarily to benefit the local community. This is why we have introduced the concept of the 'competitive waterfront'. As cities across the world compete for investment and global circuits of capital, their waterfronts have increasingly become spaces upon which to sell and market the city. Defining and analysing 'public' benefit has, as a result, proved challenging. The case study developments had been in place since the 1980s and it was hard to find meaningful statistics, for example net job gains and their local impact over time. There was, rather, an unquantified sense that redevelopment had been beneficial:

*No, I don't think there's any measurement [of public benefit] per se, but I can't see anybody losing out. In terms of the regeneration, while it has slowed somewhat, it has created jobs, it has created leisure space, and I don't see any real downside ... it is open to everyone ... it still has to be commercially viable but I haven't seen anything which has been promoted that actually excludes (PRIV7, Belfast).*

Not everyone shared this optimism and we found narratives of exclusion which certainly indicated that the benefits were uneven:

*... two of the [Docklands] zones deliberately exclude the local indigenous communities so that they could say in their marketing that 80% of the people living there have degrees, of course they do if you exclude the fucking poor people (CVS1, Dublin).*


*I'm not a sociologist I just build things and we were instrumental in bringing shiny offices and yuppie flats into Cardiff Bay and there has been some human displacement (PRIV3, Cardiff).*

*... you have a very interesting dichotomy here, you have got the rich and famous in St David's you have got the socially mobile and affluent dining in Mermaids Quay, you have got some of the highest salaries in Cardiff being paid to lawyers who work in some of these buildings we created and you've got Butetown (CVS2, Cardiff).*

*[The waterfront] ... absolutely does not reflect the cultural diversity of Liverpool (CVS1, Liverpool)*

## 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed empirical material from the research case studies in three ways. First, it has looked at the reasons why waterfront areas were developed and why they are important to the case study cities, the impact of the economic downturn and future prospects. Second, it has examined the findings against the 'competitive waterfront' typology developed in Chapter Two. A full assessment will be made in Chapter Five, however to summarise it was found that functions are converging under the ideological umbrella of neoliberal urbanism and city competitiveness but form is different due to different patterns of land availability, and connectivity remains an issue. Although communities were excluded from meaningful participation in the governance of waterfront development, we found this was not reflected in a general feeling of alienation towards regeneration programmes and public access to the developments was not controlled to the degree we had expected. Third, we tried to assess the degree of public benefit gained from waterfront development. We found that understanding of the concept was weak amongst many of the people we interviewed and concluded that it is important to understand the extent to which most waterfront projects are not intended to benefit the immediate population, rather their focus is on appealing to investors, tourists and the general public. Most facilitation of public benefit takes place through public sector mechanisms although it can be implemented by any sector. Some collective benefits from the waterfront environment have perhaps been underestimated in the academic literature. Chapter Five will end the report by considering the implications of the research in more detail.



## 5.0 Analysis, conclusions and recommendations




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### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the research report and is in five parts. It begins with a review of waterfront development in the 21st century, through assessing the viability of the 'competitive waterfront' framework for analysis by testing it against the empirical data found in the four case studies, using an assemblage approach. The questions derived from the literature on 'who benefits' are also assessed in the light of the research evidence. Then there is a return to the research aims, objectives and research questions. Shorter concluding sections provide recommendations for scholarship and for regeneration policy and practice.

### 5.2 Waterfront development in the 21st century

Chapter Two described how the role and characteristics of urban waterfronts have evolved over time in response to changing economic, technological, political and social conditions, developing a generic, global model of commodified mixed use through policy transfer (Brownill, 2013). The chapter assessed models of waterfront

development including Hoyle (1988; 2000), Shaw (2001), and Galland and Hansen (2012), and selected Hoyle's model as the most coherent although in need of updating. The literature review resulted in a four-part framework for analysis which sets out the components for a potential new stage to Hoyle's waterfront typology, entitled the 'competitive waterfront', including aspects of: the ideological framework for development; governance; use of space (land and water); and connectivity (Figure 4). The framework is put together so that waterfront development processes and change in specific cases may be examined using an assemblage approach (McCann and Ward, 2011). This means that the interaction of specific elements at the macro, meso and micro levels are considered together so that context, structures and agency are taken into account. In this way an over-deterministic approach towards neoliberal urbanism is avoided.

#### Testing the 'competitive waterfront' framework for analysis

**Category 1: the ideological framework.** The primary purpose of all the waterfront areas was to attract private sector investment, to create jobs and to add value, thus following the principles of neoliberal urbanism.

There was a strong discourse about competitiveness and city marketing, with a focus on the waterfront as a marketable brand. However, there was also an underlying acknowledgement of the importance of public sector financial and strategic support in order to be able to achieve regeneration goals, resulting in a 'soft neoliberal' approach of a partnership with the state, rather than relying on the market alone. For example, promoting the waterfront and the wider city environment as attractive for investment and tourism implied the need for workable public infrastructure such as reliable transport, health, education and policing provision. After the financial crisis, development agencies were aware of the need for continued public subsidy in order to maintain conditions for private investment, which had become more competitive at a time when public funds were scarce. Therefore the characteristics found were in line with the 'competitive waterfront' except that the public/private balance of power was more even than we had expected.

**Category 2: governance.** The governance of the waterfronts was based on public/private partnerships, with community involvement much less evident except in Dublin, where the particular circumstances of the origins of the development had resulted in a different governance structure and more substantial community gains. Public subsidy was of the utmost importance for facilitating private investment, but regulation (such as planning) and strategic frameworks were equally important contributions from the state. The private sector was involved in decision-making, sometimes directly as in the case of Belfast where the development agency was a private body, and in other cases indirectly through membership of partnership bodies or through informal contacts. Although meaningful community involvement in governance was rare, consultation took place and there was evidence of sporadic resistance to particular projects although there was no sustained counterhegemonic movement in any of the case studies; the dominant paradigm of waterfront development and no overt control of community activity was necessary. The characteristics found accorded strongly with the 'competitive waterfront', except that there was less community opposition than we expected.

**Category 3: use of space (land and water).** Use of space was shaped in detail by ideological and governance factors, but in each case within a mixed use framework in which the emotional appeal of water was important for some involved in the projects (an aspect which the 'competitive waterfront' framework had not taken into account). Mixed use – along with public subsidy or public sector projects – had acted as a protective factor in the aftermath of the economic downturn when private investment had slumped in three of the case studies (arguably not to any great degree in Liverpool). Lack of investment had also led developments to take any opportunities that came along rather than following a masterplan to the letter, with positive outcomes especially in Belfast. The emphasis on mixed use and flexibility allows us to say that function had converged with the rest of the city in all cases.

However, form had not: the availability of large parcels of land had provided opportunities for larger scale development such as new signature buildings and modern apartment blocks. Public access to waterfront areas was not significantly constrained. Although the cost of some events was exclusionary, free events and open public space remained available. Public benefit was almost always linked to public subsidy or some other intervention by the public sector. The characteristics found accorded to a large degree with the 'competitive waterfront' criteria although public access was not as limited as we had expected.

**Category 4: connectivity.** Physical connectivity was crucial to the success of waterfronts and it had not been prioritised in the early years of developments, perhaps due to the capital cost. Liverpool was the only case study we could describe as well-connected. This means we cannot talk about complete physical integration between waterfronts and the city, even if we can say that functions have converged. It was interesting that other case studies had plans to improve physical connectivity. Technological and marketing connectivity were taken for granted; the latter strengthening the case for functional convergence. Our new concept of connectivity 'of the mind' struck a chord with participants and helped to explain civic and community pride in the developments, as well as lack of use of waterfront amenities by local people. The characteristics found confirmed our view that connectivity had to be treated as a separate category in the analysis because it was so important and we found they were very much in line with the 'competitive waterfront' model.

**Synthesis:** First, we conclude that on balance a new phase of Hoyle's typology is justified: the 'competitive waterfront'. Here, functions are converging under the ideological umbrella of neoliberal urbanism and city competitiveness, although adopting a 'soft' neoliberal approach which depends upon public subsidy rather than entirely upon the market to achieve its objectives. This dependence has an impact of governance relations and makes public agencies more powerful, although still only to the extent that we could say there was an equal balance between public and private. The form of development found in waterfront areas remains somewhat different from inner city areas due to different use of space. Poor connectivity, especially physical and 'of the mind', can hamper the success of waterfronts and prevent developments from realising their full potential.

Secondly, do we need to adjust the component of the model in Table 2? Not significantly, although we should: pay more attention to the emotional attachment to water; be aware that community exclusion from governance may not lead to wider disaffection with the project and, conversely, that involvement does not always lead to legitimisation. Physical exclusion and control of the public may have been over-estimated and exclusion is more likely to be financial.

Thirdly, are the case study waterfront areas 'competitive waterfronts'? How do the empirical factors 'assemble'? In each case they follow the general parameters of the model. The outlier is Dublin, where community involvement is built into the governance structure more effectively and a more extensive programme of social gain is evident. The transfer of management of the development to the City Council means this approach is likely to continue. But it is important to note that interviews did not confirm community representatives' legitimisation of the development as a result. Dublin has been badly hit by the economic downturn, but has been able to begin to attract investment again despite governance problems. Liverpool is probably the clearest example of the model as it is still able to attract large-scale private investment including a new Chinese connection. Cardiff has also had governance issues in the past but now appears to be overcoming a weak residential market and focusing on leisure and entertainment. And Belfast remains propped up by public subsidy and contextualised within a weak economy and a divided city; however, its exclusion of communities from governance is more in line with the model than Dublin's more inclusive approach. However, these variations in degree do not alter the basic robustness of the typology.

### Assessment of 'who benefits'

The research also assessed the question 'who benefits', with a focus on public benefit, through four questions covering conceptualisation, type, role in and distribution of benefits.

'Public benefit' was defined very widely and in some cases redevelopment was interpreted as intrinsically beneficial because it had replaced dereliction. Definitions of both 'public' and 'benefit' in property-led development can be very different from the more targeted approach used in the regeneration of disadvantaged areas: 'public' is interpreted more widely than local residents, to include, for example, employers and tourists; and 'benefit' is seen largely in economic and amenity terms. The concept of 'trickle down' benefits was still popular and in some cases very strongly supported.

Where benefits were targeted at those who needed them more, for example social housing, employment training or education programmes, the public sector played a key role. It was clear that the facilitation of these types of public benefit was achieved largely by the public sector, either through funding, legal or negotiated agreements, or political pressure. Subsequent implementation of public benefit could be delivered by any sector, although use of the private sector for programme delivery raised governance questions of transparency and accountability which had not been satisfactorily addressed in some of the case studies.

Although it was difficult to assess which groups were benefiting with the information available to the researchers, it was an important finding that in most cases *projects were not intended primarily to benefit the local community*; rather their proposed impact was city-wide and further afield including tourists and potential investors. Narratives of exclusion from local people and the voluntary sector expressed frustration with this and indicated that benefits were uneven. However, those responsible for development might argue that the criticism is unfair given that their projects do not have an exclusively local remit. This is an important area for further research.

### Return to research aims, objectives and research questions

The research aims were to examine current trends, themes and issues in waterfront regeneration and to assess who benefits from such initiatives, through case studies in Belfast, Cardiff, Dublin and Liverpool. The research objectives were:

1. To review the relevant literature to contextualise the project, including: waterfront redevelopment; globalisation, neoliberalism and governance; the 'credit crunch' and property development; the economy and society of the UK and the Irish Republic: this was achieved and reported in Chapter Two.
2. To carry out original research in four case study areas: Titanic Quarter, Belfast, Northern Ireland; Liverpool waterfront, England; Cardiff Bay, Wales; and Dublin Docklands, Republic of Ireland, to include an assessment of the economic and social benefits of the scheme to nearby disadvantaged areas and to the cities as a whole. This was achieved and reported in Chapter Four, although the scale of the research was over-ambitious and a full assessment in each case study was not possible. Further research in each case study would be necessary to achieve this in depth.
3. To analyse the contribution of the research data to the literature on neoliberalism, waterfront redevelopment, and related areas such as city marketing and gentrification, as well as to the body of work on regeneration in divided cities. This was achieved in Chapters Four and Five, and will continue as academic papers are published from the research.
4. To consider whether the research evidence points towards a new stage in waterfront development: the restructured 'competitive waterfront'. Achieved in Chapter Two (deriving the framework) and Four and Five (feasibility analysis using case study data). Further research could apply the model to other waterfront developments or assess existing case studies in greater detail.
5. To use the theoretical framework to assess 'who benefits' from waterfront redevelopment and to make practical recommendations for the future of such development at a time of economic retrenchment. Achieved in Chapters Four and Five although lack of data has hampered an assessment of who benefits.

### The research questions were:

- ***Has the nature of waterfront development changed in response to the economic downturn? If so, is this change sufficient to be able to theorise a new phase in waterfront development?***

We felt that waterfront development had not changed substantially in response to the economic downturn, but that Hoyle's model still needed to be updated to take into account earlier changes, in particular the intensification of globalisation and uncritical acceptance of city competitiveness as the basis for economic development. Six years after the worst of the economic crisis, differences are beginning to become evident, for example an ad hoc approach to development and continuing dependence on public or charitable funds.

- ***How has neoliberalisation impacted on production, consumption and governance in waterfront areas? Who benefits from waterfront regeneration?***

Neoliberalism provides an important ideological basis for waterfront development but it is 'soft' neoliberalism based on state support as well as market mechanisms, in order to attract investment and add value. Communities remain largely excluded from governance and public benefit is widely dispersed rather than concerned with those in greatest need. Because the primary purpose of waterfront development is to attract investment, specific public benefit outcomes need to be built into strategic planning, as was the case in Dublin.

- ***What is the contribution of private sector-led development to the economic and social health of cities?***

Public benefit can be achieved through private sector-led development, but it requires the intervention of the public sector in order to facilitate benefit through subsidy, regulation or negotiation.

- ***What is the role of the public sector in supporting private development in difficult economic times?***

It is absolutely crucial. In the past, regeneration has been categorised as either property-based or regeneration of disadvantaged areas. The amount of public subsidy in both types of regeneration suggests that this is no longer a useful distinction and perhaps a new one based on public benefit would be more helpful.

## 5.3 Implications for scholarship

The research has generated a number of implications for theory and further academic research. It is important to reassess the importance and appropriateness of 'one size fits all' international models and the policy transfer approach (this point also applies to practice). Emerging responses to austerity are beginning to show that locally based solutions may be more appropriate, especially for less economically vibrant areas. Linked to this is the need to reconsider the conceptual division between property-based regeneration and regeneration of 'poor areas', given the amount of public subsidy that goes into both. A model based on intended outputs and beneficiaries may be more appropriate, perhaps making a distinction between regeneration that is intended primarily to benefit local people and regeneration with a wider remit. A particular research area which needs more attention is the environmental impact of waterfronts and the impact of the environment on waterfronts. There may be scope to work on this with private sector partners in order to devise a more sustainable model which will provide a better economic return as well as social and environmental benefits.

This research has developed a model of the 'competitive waterfront' and tested it in four cases. There is scope to continue this work with other case studies and with further longitudinal study in the cases covered here. In addition, the potential of assemblage as an analytical tool in urban research should be explored further, so that variations in neoliberal ideology can be recognised without abandoning the acceptance of a marketised context. This may allow more nuanced consideration of the role of the state in relation to community benefit and also assessment of newer funding models. Finally, it must be said that much of the academic literature about waterfront development is very negative in tone. Although these large-scale projects have often been problematic, it is also important to ask whether scholars have underestimated the gains that can be made.

## 5.4 Implications for regeneration policy and practice

Implications for regeneration policy and practice have also been generated. In common with academic research, policy-makers and regeneration practitioners need to consider the 'one size fits all' mixed use waterfront regeneration model and, when planning their programmes, to ensure they have reviewed local ideas and options as well as 'good practice' from elsewhere. Programme planning should also define more carefully who are the intended beneficiaries from waterfront development and what kind of benefits are intended. A little more honesty at an early stage in the process about what can and cannot be achieved might improve working relationships between the private, public and community sectors.

Waterfront redevelopment usually sits within a larger strategic planning framework as well as working to its own framework such as a Masterplan. However, the monitoring and evaluation of implementation appears weak, especially at the more local level, and when work has been done then it is not always publicly available.

Easy access to programme information should be a condition of public funding for private and voluntary sector projects. Consideration should also be given to more resources for assessment of waterfront regeneration performance in a multi-agency framework over time, including the development of a method for defining and measuring public benefit. This work needs to be state-led but could be funded by levies, for example from 'planning gain' payments. It is important to consider what is meant by 'community involvement' in waterfront development. Who is the community and how are they to be involved? It is recommended that involvement in governance and programme delivery is pursued, including providing opportunities for social economy organisations. Improving connectivity is the final, crucial issue, including connectivity 'of the mind', to ensure that the waterfront is perceived as a valuable and integral part of the city. Finally, we have been very surprised by the small amount of attention paid to ecological matters in the literature and in our case study: surely, this is key to the survival of all waterfront developments and should receive more attention. All in all, one day we hope to see the 'competitive waterfront' replaced by the 'sustainable waterfront'.



Image source: kenny1 / Shutterstock.com

## 6.0 References

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## Web sites

### Belfast Harbour Commissioners:

<https://www.belfast-harbour.co.uk/interactive-harbour>

### Butetown Connected, Cardiff:

<http://www.butetownconnected.org.uk/>

### Cardiff Bay:

<http://cardiffbay.co.uk/>

### Cardiff Harbour Authority:

<http://www.cardiffharbour.com/>

### Dublin Docklands Development Authority:

<http://www.dublindocklands.ie/>

### Dublin Port Company:

<http://www.dublinport.ie/>

### International Sports Village, Cardiff:

<http://www.internationalsportsvillage.com/>

### Liverpool Vision:

<http://www.liverpoolvision.co.uk/>

### Liverpool Waterfront:

<http://www.liverpoolwaterfront.org/>

### Liverpool Waters:

<http://www.liverpoolwaters.co.uk/>

### Porth Teigr, Cardiff:

<http://www.porthteigr.com/en/home>

### Titanic Foundation:

<http://www.titanic-foundation.org/>

### Titanic Quarter:

<http://titanic-quarter.com/>

# 7.0 Appendices



# Appendix 1 – Case Study Profiles

Appendix One consists of more detailed information about the case study areas, to supplement the descriptions in Chapter One. In all cases it was extremely difficult to obtain reliable statistical information about the developments.

**Table A**

**Belfast waterfront case study profile**

<b>Belfast</b>	
<b>Factor</b>	<b>Details</b>
<b>Time span of development and any significant phases</b>	<p><b>1989 – 2007:</b> Laganside UDC, 200 hectares – offices, private apartments, Lagan Weir opened 1994. UDC remit subsequently extended to Gasworks area and Cathedral Quarter .</p> <p><b>2007 – present:</b> Laganside area managed &amp; developed further by Department of Social Development: public space, river, weir. Waterfront Hall managed by Belfast City Council</p> <p><b>2000:</b> Opening of Odyssey Arena (National Lottery Millennium Project)</p> <p><b>2001:</b> Work started on site preparation and Masterplan for Titanic Quarter (TQ)</p> <p><b>2005:</b> Harcourt Developments leased site from Harbour Commissioners and purchased development rights for £46m; TQ Development Framework published (Turley Associates, 2005).</p> <p><b>2005:</b> NI Science Park opened</p> <p><b>TQ Phase 1:</b> Hotel 2010; 475 apartments; Gateway offices 2009 (main tenant Citibank) Belfast Met and PRONI 2011</p> <p><b>TQ Phase 2:</b> 3.3m sq ft of mixed use development including Titanic Belfast museum, refurbishment of the Harland &amp; Wolff HQ into a hotel; and development of the Titanic and Olympic slipways as public space.</p> <p><b>Plus:</b> Titanic Studios (planning permission for extension granted 2014)</p> <p><b>TQ web site 2014:</b> 145,000 sq ft developed, 90 companies on site, around 5,000 people living and working there, plan eventually to provide homes and employment for 50,000</p>
<b>Scale of development</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> 140 hectares originally, extended to 200 hectares</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> 75 hectares</p> <p><b>Northern Ireland Science Park:</b> 10 hectares</p>
<b>Location in relation to city centre</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> adjacent.</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> Less than a mile away.</p>
<b>Development agency and other key actors</b>	<p><b>Laganside UDC</b></p> <p><b>Department for Social Development</b></p> <p><b>Titanic Quarter Ltd.</b> (subsidiary of Harcourt Developments, private company)</p> <p><b>Belfast City Council</b></p> <p><b>Belfast Harbour Commissioners</b> (Trust Port and freehold owners of TQ lands)</p> <p><b>Titanic Belfast:</b> Titanic Foundation Ltd. (charity)</p> <p><b>Northern Ireland Tourist Board</b> and <b>Invest NI</b> are major funders</p>
<b>Indicative overall costs</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> £939m investment by 2007 (not clear whether public or private). By 1998: £55m from regional government, £29m from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), £40m for Belfast’s Millennium Project (the Odyssey Arena) and additional sums from Lottery and EU PEACE funds (OECD, 2000)</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> figures of £5bn and £7bn over 20 years have been quoted</p>
<b>Indicative costs and funding sources of some individual projects</b>	<p><b>Waterfront Hall:</b> £32m total. Funded by Belfast City Council, Urban Development Grant and the European Regional Development Fund.</p> <p><b>Odyssey Arena Millennium Project:</b> £120m total. Funded by Millennium Commission, Laganside £9m towards site infrastructure, Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure, Sports Council NI, Sheridan Group (private).</p> <p><b>Graving Dock/Pump House:</b> £1.2m NI Tourist Board, £1.5m Dept. of Environment</p>

continued

continued

<b>Belfast</b>	
<b>Factor</b>	<b>Details</b>
<b>Indicative costs and funding sources of some individual projects</b> (continued)	<p><b>Nomadic historic tug boat:</b> £250K for purchase from Dept of Social Development; funding for refurbishment EU Peace III £2.27m; other funding from Heritage Lottery Fund, NITB, BCC and Ulster Garden Villages [charity], total £6.5m. Public Records Office of NI new HQ: £30m [PPP]</p> <p><b>Belfast Metropolitan College:</b> £44m [PPP]</p> <p><b>Titanic Belfast:</b> NI Tourist Board £37m; Belfast City Council £10m; Harbour Commissioners £13.6m; TQ Ltd £16.35m [private]; total cost £77m (Magee, 2012) – £97m including VAT</p> <p><b>Abercorn Basin marina</b> funded by the NI Tourist Board and Belfast Tall Ships 2009 Ltd. [no figures]</p> <p><b>Conversion of Harland &amp; Wolff HQ to hotel with public access to Drawing Office:</b> £5m from Heritage Lottery Fund, announced in 2014</p>
<b>Governance structure(s)</b>	<p><b>Laganside UDC 1989 – 2007</b></p> <p><b>Laganside 2007 – present:</b> DSD</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> Private sector plus Titanic Belfast run by Titanic Foundation [Charitable trust]. Some involvement from Belfast City Council in relation to Titanic Belfast Memorandum of Understanding NI Science Park managed separately</p>
<b>Signature building(s) and other significant features</b>	<p><b>1997:</b> Waterfront Hall: planning permission granted 2014 for extension to include new conference venue.</p> <p><b>2000:</b> Odyssey Arena [sport and entertainment centre]; building also includes science exploration facility W5</p> <p><b>2011:</b> PRONI and Belfast Metropolitan College</p> <p><b>2012:</b> Titanic Belfast</p> <p><b>From late 2000s:</b> Paint Hall/Titanic Studios</p> <p><b>Original Harland &amp; Wolff HQ and Drawing Office:</b> half used for TQ Ltd offices; half derelict currently, to be restored in next few years</p>
<b>Residential development</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> Over 700 completed housing units, all private.</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> Phase 1 – 475 apartments, all private, with marina. Completed 2010. Phase 2 – 2000 planned with social or affordable housing component of 10 – 15%</p>
<b>Office or manufacturing development</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> Over 213,000m<sup>2</sup> of office space (2007). Includes BT Regional HQ; PriceWaterhouse Coopers HQ; Gasworks site almost entirely office including some public agencies and Halifax bank</p> <p><b>2002:</b> Northern Ireland Science Park: Opened 2002.</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> Gateway offices 150k sq ft, main tenant Citibank.</p> <p><b>2014:</b> 90 companies based in the area [TQ web site]</p> <p><b>2014:</b> planning permission granted for new offices between PRONI and Belfast Metropolitan College, 3000 sq ft</p> <p><b>Under construction:</b> North Yard mixed use 150,000 sq ft</p>
<b>Leisure, creative, retail, culture and tourism development</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> over 83,000m<sup>2</sup> completed retail/leisure space (2007): Waterfront Hall, Hilton Hotel 200 bedrooms, public art; Radisson Blu hotel in Gasworks; riverside walkway</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> Odyssey, Titanic Belfast, Nomadic, Thompson Graving Dock [all heritage]; hotel, public art; Titanic Studios [opened 2005]; 20k sq ft retail [most unoccupied to date]</p> <p><b>2009:</b> 40-berth marina opened in Abercorn Basin.</p> <p><b>2010:</b> Premier Inn hotel and Belfast Audi HQ and showroom opened</p> <p><b>2011:</b> PRONI</p> <p><b>2012:</b> Titanic Belfast (first part of Phase 2 to open): 1st year 800,000 visitors, target was 300,000</p>
<b>Other notable content</b>	<p>Both Laganside and TQ have included public art, more successfully in the case of Laganside Belfast Metropolitan College opened 2011.</p>
<b>Jobs created or estimated</b>	<p><b>Laganside:</b> 14,200 jobs estimated 2007</p> <p><b>TQ:</b> Premier Inn 40 jobs; Titanic Belfast 300; Audi showroom 115</p> <p>TQ web site says there are over 4,000 employees in the area in 2014</p> <p>TQ intention is to create 25,000 new jobs over the next 20 years [TQ web site]</p>

continued

continued

## Belfast

Factor	Details
Connectivity	<b>Poor</b> – few buses, train station not that near. Rapid transit bus service planned. Queen’s Quay development on other side of River Lagan will include a new footbridge.
Community involvement	Laganside Community Strategy 2003; TQ Memorandum of Understanding with BCC for Titanic Belfast jobs, terms not met; Titanic Foundation runs Titanic Ambassadors scheme and projects with schools
Any other notable features/comments	Considered by government to be an important part of Belfast’s transition to a post-conflict city capable of attracting foreign direct investment to revitalise a stagnant peripheral economy.

Table B

Cardiff waterfront case study profile

## Cardiff

Factor	Details
Time span of development and any significant phases	<p><b>1985:</b> Atlantic Wharf including South Glamorgan Council HQ, residential and leisure</p> <p><b>1987 – 2000:</b> Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (UDC): Barrage, mixed use development of Inner Harbour docks area of South Cardiff and Penarth, 13km of water frontage</p> <p><b>1999:</b> Mermaid Quay</p> <p><b>2000 onwards,</b> not yet complete: International Sports Village – swimming pool, 2 hotels, Ice Arena Wales, White Water Centre, retail, marina, indoor snow centre, bars and restaurants</p> <p><b>Current:</b> Port Teigr mixed use development</p> <p><b>Current:</b> Cardiff Pointe residential development – 798 homes planned</p>
Scale of development	<p><b>Atlantic Wharf:</b> 36 hectares</p> <p><b>CBDC:</b> 1100 hectares</p> <p><b>International Sports Village:</b> 27 hectares</p> <p><b>Port Teigr:</b> 15 hectares</p> <p><b>Cardiff Pointe:</b> 6 hectares</p>
Location in relation to city centre	One mile away
Development agency and other key actors	<p>CBDC worked closely with the Welsh Office and Welsh Development Agency</p> <p>CBDC was a UDC. On its winding up, responsibilities were passed to a number of successor bodies: Cardiff City Council, Cardiff Harbour Authority, Welsh Development Agency, Vale of Glamorgan Council, Countryside Council for Wales.</p> <p>The Barrage and lake is managed by Cardiff Harbour Authority</p> <p>Associated British Ports [private]</p> <p>Igloo [private]: Port Teigr</p>
Indicative overall costs	<p><b>Atlantic Wharf:</b> total of £9m grant from central and local government [Cowell and Thomas, 2002]</p> <p><b>CBDC:</b> Total Estimated Cost £2.4 billion with a public/private investment leverage of 1:4. £1.8bn private finance. CBDC’s own expenditure 1987 – 2000 was £513m [Punter, 2006] and they made £37m of grants to individual developments. Also £38m spent on social housing</p> <p><b>International Sports Village:</b> £700m (£16m on remediation)</p> <p><b>Cardiff Pointe:</b> £200m</p>

continued

continued

## Cardiff

Factor	Details
<b>Indicative costs and funding sources of some individual projects</b>	<p>South Glamorgan County Council Atlantic Wharf HQ £20m</p> <p>Wales Millennium Centre cost £106.2m; Welsh Government provided £37m (Welsh Government web site). Arts Council Wales provides continuing capital and revenue support to the building (£300K capital and £3.7m revenue, 2011 figures)</p> <p>Cardiff Bay Barrage cost £220m</p> <p>Butetown Regeneration £8m from EU and Welsh Government</p> <p>Private investors include: Schroder (Mermaid Quay); Aviva Investors (3 Assembly Sq); BA Pension Fund (Red Dragon Centre); Igloo (Porth Teigr)</p> <p>Private investment 2003-08 estimated at £508m: Private housing £273m; social housing £23m; office £144m; retail: £44m; hotels: £24m.</p> <p>Overall private investment from 1987 estimated at over £1.6bn</p>
<b>Governance structure(s)</b>	<p><b>UDC 1987 – 2000</b></p> <p><b>2000 onwards:</b> UDC successor bodies are Cardiff Council (including Cardiff Harbour Authority), the Welsh Development Agency, Vale of Glamorgan Council and the Countryside Council for Wales. Mainly Cardiff Council; the Harbour Authority manages the Barrage and lake</p>
<b>Signature building(s) and other significant features</b>	<p><b>1998:</b> Cardiff Bay Barrage, 1.1km long – technical difficulties caused delay in its development</p> <p><b>2000:</b> Roald Dahl Plass – public square, includes 70ft, Water Tower public art</p> <p><b>2004:</b> Wales Millennium Centre</p> <p><b>2006:</b> The Senedd (Welsh Government) – over budget and almost five years late</p>
<b>Residential development</b>	<p><b>By 2008:</b> a total of 8,596 new dwellings completed, starting with the Atlantic Wharf development</p> <p>CBDC completed 3,243 homes, 31% social housing (Punter, 2006)</p> <p><b>2000-07:</b> 500 new affordable homes, £30m equivalent (possibly planning gain?)</p> <p><b>Cardiff Pointe:</b> 798 homes planning permissions granted 2013, will include 12.5% social housing</p> <p>Butetown regeneration separate. Including Angelian Street redevelopment (48 new homes)</p>
<b>Office or manufacturing development</b>	<p><b>CBDC:</b> 14,000,000 square feet (1,300,000 m<sup>2</sup>) of non-housing development</p> <p><b>2003-2008:</b> 144,474 sq. m. of business, industrial and warehouse use; 2,200 workplaces in the area</p> <p>@Wales Digital Media Initiative (business incubator)</p> <p>3 Assembly Square 66,000 sq ft flagship development</p>
<b>Leisure, creative, retail, culture and tourism development</b>	<p><b>Atlantic Wharf Leisure Village</b></p> <p><b>CBDC:</b> About 81 hectares of derelict land was reclaimed; the Cardiff Bay Barrage was constructed to create a freshwater lake, completed in 1998. 59 hectares of public space provided in the area</p> <p><b>Wales Millennium Centre includes:</b> Royal Opera House, National Dance Company Wales, BBC Symphony Orchestra Wales</p> <p><b>Mermaid Quay:</b> retail, restaurants and cafés, entertainment, 140,000 sq ft</p> <p><b>The Dr Who Experience</b></p> <p><b>Red Dragon Centre:</b> restaurants and cafés, entertainment, hotel</p> <p><b>International Sports Village:</b> Olympic Pool, Whitewater Centre</p> <p><b>BBC Roath Lock Studios:</b> 170,000 sq ft</p> <p><b>Port Teigr GloWorks</b> (Centre for the Creative Industries) opened 2014, 32,000 sq ft</p> <p><b>Percent for Art scheme</b> for public art</p>
<b>Other notable content</b>	<p>£8m Butetown Regeneration (training, employment, community centre, youth project) including new housing and redevelopment of Loudoun Square</p> <p>Cardiff Bay Wetlands Reserve</p> <p>Techniquiest educational charity</p> <p>BT Cardiff Bay Data Centre: 12,000 servers</p>

continued

continued

## Cardiff

Factor	Details
Jobs created or estimated	<p><b>CBDC (1987-2000):</b> around 31,000 new jobs</p> <p><b>By 2004:</b> approx. 17,000 permanent jobs and 13,000 construction jobs</p> <p><b>2003-07:</b> net increase of 5,302 jobs in the old CBDC area</p> <p>Overall estimate of jobs created since 1987: 27,000</p>
Connectivity	<p><b>Lloyd George Avenue:</b> new road linking the Bay with the city centre.</p> <p><b>Barrier:</b> Wall (railway embankment) between Butetown and the Bay</p> <p><b>Butetown Link and Tunnel:</b> Peripheral Distributor Road</p> <p><b>Cardiff Waterbus</b> between the Bay and City Centre</p> <p><b>Pont y Werin Bridge</b></p> <p><b>2014:</b> South Wales Metro system announced, to start with link between Cardiff Bay and City Centre, cost £18m</p>
Community involvement	<p>Some small projects in Butetown funded by CBDC – small community development team included local grants and training schemes [Thomas and Imrie, 1999]; more recent Butetown Regeneration Cardiff Bay Business Forum established 1992; appears not to be still in existence</p> <p>Harbour Authority funds trips around the Harbour for community groups and schools visits</p>
Any other notable features/comments	<p>This case study probably has the most problematic projects e.g. the Barrage, Millennium Centre, Senedd.</p>

Table C

### Dublin waterfront case study profile

## Dublin

Factor	Details
Time span of development and any significant phases	<p><b>1985:</b> Custom House Docks Development Authority [CHDDA]. Mixed use development including International Financial Services Centre [IFSC], other offices, retail, hotel, public space, residential.</p> <p><b>1997-present:</b> Dublin Docklands Development Authority [DDDA]. Mixed use development through the mechanism of a 5-yearly Masterplan; Area Action Plans: Grand Canal Dock, Ringsend/Irishtown, City Quay and Westland Row, East Wall; and Area Planning Schemes for North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock; Draft Area Planning Scheme for Poolbeg.</p> <p><b>2012:</b> DDDA to be abolished (legislation going through in 2014), powers to go to Dublin City Council [DCC] including a Strategic Development Zone [SDZ] with a fast-track planning process</p> <p><b>2012:</b> SDZ designated by Minister for the Environment, covering North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock i.e. not the total Docklands area</p>
Scale of development	<p><b>CHDDA:</b> 30 hectares</p> <p><b>DDDA:</b> 526 hectares</p> <p><b>SDZ:</b> 66 hectares, with 22 hectares of development land available</p>
Location in relation to city centre	<p>Adjacent</p>
Development agency and other key actors	<p>CHDDA, appointed Board</p> <p>DDDA, appointed Board</p> <p>Dublin Port Company</p> <p>Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government; other Government departments and An Bord Pleanála (planning appeals body)</p> <p>DCC, elected local authority</p>

continued

continued

## Dublin

Factor	Details
Indicative overall costs	<b>CHDDA:</b> IRE421m total investment, vast majority office (IRE350m) <b>DDDA:</b> over €3.35bn public and private investment
Indicative costs and funding sources of some individual projects	DDDA investment estimated at €2bn by 2012, 80% private sector and the remainder infrastructure investment by DCC (€127m) plus proceeds from development e.g. land sales. €5bn investment estimated by 2008 [C&AG, 2012]. <b>Samuel Beckett Bridge:</b> €60m <b>Convention Centre Dublin:</b> €380m <b>Point Village development (under construction):</b> €800m <b>Dublin Port:</b> €110m investment programme 2013-17 including new cruise liner docking facility - separate from DDDA investment
Governance structure(s)	<b>1987-97:</b> CHDDA – appointed Board <b>1997-2014:</b> DDDA – 7-person appointed Board with commercial expertise; 25-person appointed Council including state agencies, 7 community representatives, business interests <b>2014 onwards:</b> DCC. Preparation for takeover began in 2012 with appointment of new Board chaired by DCC Chief Executive. The SDZ will require a separate Planning Scheme. Masterplans were issued in 1997, 2003 and 2008
Signature building(s) and other significant features	<b>1990 – 97:</b> International Financial Services Centre <b>2005:</b> Sean O’Casey footbridge <b>2008:</b> O2 Arena (on site of former Point Theatre 1988 – 2007) – 14,000 capacity <b>2009:</b> Sean O’Casey Community Centre <b>2009:</b> Samuel Beckett Bridge, designed by Santiago Calatrava <b>2010:</b> Convention Centre Dublin – 45,921 sq m, flexible layout including hall to seat up to 2,000 people <b>2010:</b> Bord Gais Energy Theatre – 2,100 capacity
Residential development <small>[as most current development is described as mixed use, it was difficult to get a breakdown of individual uses]</small>	<b>1998 (CHDDA remit):</b> Demolition of Sherriff Street flats (445, social housing); replaced by Custom House Square – 620 private units plus retail. 11,000 new homes of which 20% are social or affordable (DDDA web site) Housing included in mixed use developments including Grand Canal Square and Point Village
Office or manufacturing development	<b>CHDDA</b> attracted over 500 international companies to Dublin (Moore-Cherry and Vinci, 2013) Offices included in mixed use developments including Grand Canal Square and Point Village <b>Recent arrivals include:</b> Google (planning for over 2,000 employees), Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter. Spencer Dock: over 300,000 sq m of office space, in development. PriceWaterhouse Coopers in Ireland relocated there 2007 with 2,100 employees Cluster of legal firms developing at Sir John Rogerson’s Quay
Leisure, creative, retail, culture and tourism development	<b>CHDDA investment</b> included landscaping and upgrading of lighting a walkways. <b>Mayor Square:</b> public space including restaurants, cafés and convenience stores <b>2001:</b> River Liffey Regeneration Strategy <b>2007:</b> Docklands Campshire Vision Refurbishment of chq building (warehouse) for retail use, but demand remains low. <b>Grand Canal Square:</b> public space designed by Martha Schwarz. 10,000 sq m including Grand Canal Theatre, hotel, offices. <b>Point Village:</b> 25,000 sq m of retail floorspace planned, mixed use including shopping centre, cinema, museum, offices, hotel and apartments. O2 Arena also based at The Point.
Other notable content	National College of Ireland campus for third level education; plus other courses to support learning for local people, including educational career guidance Affordable house purchase scheme was run for low income households

continued

continued

## Dublin

Factor	Details
Jobs created or estimated	<p><b>CHDDA:</b> 15,000 new jobs [Moore-Cherry and Vinci, 2013]</p> <p><b>DDDA:</b> 40,000 new jobs</p> <p>IFSC currently employs around 35,500 people</p>
Connectivity	<p><b>2009:</b> LUAS [tram] extension to O2 Arena</p> <p>Sean O' Casey Bridge and Samuel Beckett Bridge link North and South banks of the River Liffey</p> <p>Canals join up at Grand Canal Dock, now forms a circular route around the city</p>
Community involvement	<p><b>1995:</b> CHDDA Community Liaison Committee formed [Moore, 2008]</p> <p><b>1997:</b> 20% social or affordable housing requirement introduced by DDDA</p> <p><b>1997:</b> Local Employment Charter introduced – 20% of jobs in construction to be filled by local people; also Jobs Placement Programme and Local Employment Forum</p> <p><b>1999:</b> Community Development Project Initiative – 75% funding provided for capital projects. €6.25m spent on 250 projects. Less has been spent in recent years due to the financial situation</p> <p>Over 40 educational projects funded and a School Principals Forum; local population education indicators improve greatly between 1997 and 2005 [Moore, 2008]</p> <p>Seniors Forum, Childcare Forum, Young People Forum, Annual Social Regeneration Conference</p> <p>Sean O'Casey Community Centre: €9m new build. 2000 sq m including a crèche, facilities for the elderly, a sports hall and theatre</p> <p>St Andrews Resource Centre: refurbishment</p> <p>Docklands Business Forum</p>
Any other notable features/comments	<p>Population growth from 17,500 [1997] to 22,000 [2008]</p> <p>The reason DDA is being wound up is a damning audit report identifying conflict of interest on the Board [CGAG, 2012; Moore-Cherry, 2012].</p>

Table D

### Liverpool waterfront case study profile

## Liverpool

Factor	Details
Time span of development and any significant phases	<p><b>1981 – 98:</b> Merseyside Development Corporation – mixed use regeneration of south docks. First phase opened in 1984. The boundary was extended northwards in 1988 and a new development strategy produced in 1990 which had more emphasis on employment</p> <p><b>1988:</b> Opening of Albert Dock and Tate Liverpool [art gallery]</p> <p><b>2000:</b> King's Waterfront: Strategic Regeneration Framework issued, work began 2005 and still ongoing – Exhibition Centre, hotel, leisure-led mixed use</p> <p><b>2012:</b> Plan issued for Waterspace [South Docks]: three zones of leisure-led mixed use</p> <p><b>2013:</b> Planning approved for Liverpool Waters [North Docks]. Mixed use to include cruise liner terminal and International Trade Centre with Chinese investment</p>
Scale of development	<p><b>MDC:</b> 350 hectares 1981; extended to 960 hectares in 1988 – includes Albert Dock – shops, offices, restaurants, flats, Maritime Museum, hotels, Tate Liverpool.</p> <p><b>Liverpool One:</b> 17 hectares</p> <p><b>King's Dock:</b> 11 hectares</p> <p><b>Liverpool Waters (north docks):</b> 60 hectares</p> <p><b>Princes Dock:</b> 15 hectares – 3 office towers, conference centre, 2 hotels. Part of Liverpool Waters [owned by Peel]</p> <p><b>Waterspace (south docks):</b> 35 hectares</p>

continued

continued

## Liverpool

Factor	Details
Location in relation to city centre	10 mins. walk; connected via Liverpool One shopping centre. 1 mile from Lime St station
Development agency and other key actors	MDC as above Arrowcroft Group (private developer): 1982 agreement to develop Albert Dock Liverpool Vision and Liverpool City Council English Partnerships own the Kings Dock site Liverpool Waters: Peel Holdings
Indicative overall costs	MDC: £399m public; £548m private (Meegan, 1999). Includes £20m dredging and restoring dock walls and gates (Parkinson, 1988); £314m bringing derelict land and buildings back into use; £34m business and community development; £16m promotion and marketing (Boland, 2013). Final forecast private investment £662m (Meegan, 1999). King's Waterfront: £164m, including Exhibition Centre £69m Queens Dock Custom and Excise Building £30m Liverpool Waters: £5.5bn investment estimated
Indicative costs and funding sources of some individual projects	<b>Restoration of Albert Dock:</b> £25m (MDC) <b>International Garden Festival:</b> £32m (MDC), of which £14m was land acquisition and reclamation. Only 20% recovered from admission charges and plan to convert site into leisure centre were not achieved. <b>Liverpool One:</b> £920m <b>Museum of Liverpool:</b> £72m <b>Echo Arena and Convention Centre:</b> Liverpool City Council £17m; English Partnerships £70m and owned the land; Northwest Regional Development Agency £17m; EU Objective 1 £55m, total £159m
Governance structure(s)	<b>MDC 1981-98:</b> Run by Board of 111 including representatives of the 3 councils. Monitored by Merseyside Task Force (government agency) until 1993 and then by the regional branch of the Department of the Environment; and required to co-operate with local authorities and other statutory bodies. <b>1999:</b> Liverpool Vision strategic development agency for the city established – includes Liverpool City Council, Homes and Communities Agency <b>Mersey Partnership:</b> economic development of the Liverpool city-region <b>Liverpool Waters is an Enterprise Zone:</b> rates discounts, simplified planning regime and support for superfast broadband
Signature building(s) and other significant features	<b>1986:</b> Merseyside Maritime Museum, Albert Dock <b>1988:</b> Tate Liverpool, Albert Dock <b>2007:</b> International Slavery Museum <b>2008:</b> Liverpool One shopping centre <b>2008:</b> Echo Arena (11,000 capacity) and BT Convention Centre, Kings Waterfront: 1,350 seat auditorium, 18 breakout rooms, 7125 sq m exhibition space. Hosted over 200 events in 2008 <b>2011:</b> Museum of Liverpool: 8,000 sq m of exhibition space
Residential development <small>(as most current development is described as mixed use, it was difficult to get a breakdown of individual uses)</small>	<b>MDC:</b> 3,621 final forecast (Meegan, 1999) including 920 housing association homes <b>Eldonian housing co-operative and Liverpool Housing Trust:</b> 500 social housing dwellings and community facilities, within the extended MDC area. See Couch (2003) <b>Planned:</b> Queens Dock Custom and Excise Building conversion to 240 apartments and community space; Festival Gardens site: 1300 new homes; Liverpool Waters: over 9,000 residential units
Office or manufacturing development	<b>MDC:</b> 698 sq m final forecast (Meegan, 1999) <b>Brunswick Business Park:</b> 850,000 sq ft <b>Planned:</b> Liverpool Waters 3.3m sq ft of office space (some already available in Prices Dock)

continued

continued

## Liverpool

Factor	Details
Leisure, creative, retail, culture and tourism development	<p><b>Albert Dock</b> attracts around 5 million visitors annually</p> <p><b>International Garden Festival, 1984:</b> over 3.4 million visitors on 49 hectare site; but site reverted to dereliction afterwards</p> <p><b>Liverpool One:</b> 131,000 sq m</p> <p><b>Kings Waterfront:</b> hotel, leisure amenities; cruise liner facility</p> <p><b>Museum of Liverpool and International Slavery Museum</b></p> <p><b>Pedestrian walkway</b> along the river frontage</p> <p><b>Pier Head cruise liner terminal</b></p> <p><b>Planned:</b> Exhibition Centre 8,100 sq m., due to open 2015.</p>
Jobs created or estimated	<p><b>MDC:</b> 22,254 jobs created final forecast (Meegan, 1999)</p> <p><b>Liverpool One:</b> 4,000 jobs created</p> <p><b>Liverpool Waters:</b> 17,000 new jobs estimated</p> <p><b>Princes Dock:</b> 2,500 people currently employed</p>
Connectivity	<p>Good – near main road with buses; train stations nearby. Liverpool One shopping centre provide a route through from the City Centre</p> <p>Liverpool Canal Link (2009)</p> <p>Support for superfast broad band in Liverpool Waters Enterprise Zone</p>
Community involvement	<p>MDC initially had little direct community involvement because it was not a residential area before the start of the redevelopment. Consultation took place about individual schemes on an ad hoc basis (Parkinson, 1988). This changed with the boundary extension in 1988 when more populated areas were included. Current engagement with residents (including private apartment owners) appears ad hoc</p>
Any other notable features/comments	<p>Much of the waterfront area along with some other parts of the city is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, designated in 2004: Stanley Dock conservation area, Pier Head complex, Mann Island, Albert and Wapping warehouses, Old Dock site. It includes 15 surviving pre-1850 docks and 9 large dockside warehouses (Rodwell, 2008).</p> <p>Liverpool was European Capital of Culture in 2008: 15m visitors to the city, economic impact £800m (Boland, 2013)</p>

## Appendix 2 – Organisations represented in case study interviews

In order to comply with ethical guidelines on anonymity, no names and job titles have been provided. In some other cases, respondents have indicated that they do not want their organisations to be named and so the sector of the organisation is listed. Some respondents were interviewed after they had left the organisations provided and one or two they were able to provide a perspective from more than one organisation; in others, more than one respondent was interviewed from an organisation. Both scoping and principal research phases are included.

### Belfast

- A private sector organisation
- A public sector organisation
- A public sector quango
- Two community and voluntary sector organisations
- Belfast City Council
- CBRE Northern Ireland
- Harcourt Developments
- Laganside
- Titanic Foundation
- Titanic Quarter Ltd.

### Cardiff

- Two community and voluntary sector organisations
- A public sector development organisation
- ABP Ports
- Cardiff City Council
- Igloo Developments

### Dublin

- A community or voluntary sector organisation
- A private sector organisation
- CBRE Ireland
- Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government
- Dublin City Council
- Dublin Docklands Council
- Dublin Docklands Development Authority
- Dublin Port Company

### Liverpool

- Engage Liverpool
- Liverpool City Council
- Liverpool Vision
- Gower Street Estates, Albert Dock
- Peel Holdings



# Appendix 3 – Interview analysis: NVivo nodes

## Waterfront redevelopment

- Why do it and how important
- Impact of recession
- Importance of continuing to do it
- Development process including masterplanning
- Residual port function(s)
- Understanding of sustainable development
- What is the waterfront USP

## Neoliberalism and competitiveness

- Global awareness/‘world class’ discourse
- Neoliberal discourse – commodification, financialisation
- Competitiveness discourse – city marketing/branding
- Connection or disconnect with rest of city offer

## Public benefit

- Definition and discussion of concept
- Examples of public benefit from waterfronts
- Who benefits: communities of benefit
- Who benefits: geographies of benefit
- How public benefit is measured
- ‘Trickle down’ effect evident, or not?

## Public subsidy

- Definitions/understanding of public subsidy
- Attitudes to public subsidy
- Examples of public subsidy

## Role of private sector

- Types of private sector activity and why
- Sources and types of development finance
- Indications of global market
- Attractiveness of waterfront for investors
- Engagement with other sectors
- Role in decision-making

## Community involvement and role of the community and voluntary sector

- Who is the ‘community’
- Perception of area of benefit
- Consultation/involvement approach and examples
- Community and identity/sense of place
- Community ownership and pride in the waterfront
- Counterhegemonic practices
- Impact of recession

## Role of the state

- Public subsidy including infrastructure
- Legitimation
- Partnerships and other forms of facilitating involvement of other actors
- Competitiveness/city marketing agenda
- Role of planning and other regulatory functions
- Economic development in general e.g. job creation
- Role of politicians

## History

- Importance of history as waterfront USP
- ‘Selling history’ as part of the development
- History and identity

## Connectivity

- Physical e.g. public transport
- Functional – same activities
- Marketing – part of the city ‘offer’
- Technological
- ‘Of the mind’

## Use of space

- Office facilities
- Housing
- Education: schools and colleges
- Signature buildings/projects
- Retail
- Public events
- Use of/role of public space
- Shared or neutral space (mainly Northern Ireland)
- Arts, culture and history
- ‘Creative class’ and gentrification
- Meanwhile use and serendipity
- CCTV and other control of private or public space



## 8.0 Author biographies

**Dr Jenny Muir** is a Lecturer in the School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering at Queen's University Belfast. She was previously Lecturer in Housing Studies in the Department of Urban Studies at the University of Glasgow. She also spent ten years working in housing and regeneration policy for London local authorities. Jenny's research interests include urban regeneration, housing policy and practice, and the state, governance and urban change. Other current or recent projects include: assessment of the impact of economic change at neighbourhood level in Northern Ireland; a review of urban regeneration and anti-poverty policies in Northern Ireland; the governance of social housing procurement in Northern Ireland; and the ESRC Seminars Series The Big Society, Localism and Housing Policy.

**Dr Philip Boland** is a Lecturer in Planning in the School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering at Queen's University Belfast. His areas of research include local economic development, cultural planning, and the illegal drugs economy. His current areas of activity and output concern the relationship between planning and competitiveness, and the role of cultural events in transforming the fortunes of the modern city. At present he is leading a major three year research project, funded by the Leverhulme Trust, analysing Derry City of Culture 2103. Over the years Dr Boland has published numerous articles in a range of internationally recognised planning and geography journals.

**Dr Martina McKnight** is a Research Fellow at Queen's University Belfast. Since 2007 she has worked on several research projects focusing on cities and conflict, primarily Belfast and Jerusalem; recession and resilience in Northern Ireland; and this project. She is currently working with ARK ([www.ark.ac.uk](http://www.ark.ac.uk)) primarily on The Young Life and Times and Kids' Life and Times Surveys. Her research interests include gender, young people, religion, conflict and visual methods.

**John Brontë** is a PhD Research Student in the School of Planning, Architecture and Civil Engineering, Queen's University Belfast. He is a previous graduate of Queen's University Belfast, graduating with a BSc (with First Class Honours) in Environmental Planning in 2011 and an MSc (with Distinction) in Spatial Regeneration in 2012. After completing his MSc, John was employed as a Research Assistant on this project. His time on the project has shaped his current PhD research, where he is now examining the concept of the 'public interest' in urban planning, using case studies of waterfront redevelopment in Belfast and Dublin. John continues his PhD research under the supervision of Dr Philip Boland and Dr Jenny Muir.

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